FROM ONE TO THE OTHER: PROBLEM AND/OR APORIA

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In any instant, from the very beginning of the game, world, public space, body, being-in-common, extension of the soul—distance of the most proximal, and step (not) across. From the cup to the lips, from the Tarpeian Rock to the Capitol, from Charybdis to Scylla, from one border to the other, from one wall to the other from one lip to the other, from you to me, from one time to the other. (Nancy, 1997, p. 67).

My intention in this work is to think and re-think the concept of subjectivity (as well as its political implications) through considering the concepts of love and jealousy insofar as they intersect in the structure of subjectivity through the figure of the Other. Moreover, I will attempt to re-think the concept of subjectivity as something that is revealing itself as constructed by jealousy as its own strategy—namely, the strategy of subjectivity. In and through this re-thinking, I will consider the notions of possession (of the other), appropriation (of the other), and re-appropriation (of the self).

But let me here, for a moment, recall Descartes’ concept of cogito, in order to try to show that, first of all, the concept of jealousy is in the core of the emerging of an “I,” regardless of whether it is constituted as cogito, or self-consciousness, or spirit, or subject. Namely, jealousy is directly connected with the concept of possession and appropriation of the other, insofar as Descartes’ concept of cogito, as well as his definition of jealousy, is based on the belief that one can possess oneself, and thus consequently, that one can possess the other.

Political consequences of this claim are in keeping with modern political philosophy and its concept of the (political) subject. As opposed to this, contemporary political philosophy (French) gives rise to the concept of the singular being.

I will use the notion of subjectivity in the sense of the self-appropriating consciousness, in the sense of the self as self-consciousness, in the sense of the self-reflective and self-affective structure that is capable, by its very nature, of producing itself from itself (through the figure of the other as its own and thus the opposable other).

Also, I would like to relate this discussion to the question of sexual difference. In this respect, I would like to emphasize the differentiation between the concept of “subject” as empowered by being at the very place of politics (understood as political subject) and by
being at the very place of knowledge (understood as subject of ‘rational knowledge’), and the concept of ‘singular being’ by applying the pronoun ‘he’ when speaking about subject, and, respectively, applying ‘she’ when speaking about singular being. This reshaping of the traditional map of dichotomies, though seemingly speculative and reproducing the binary structure, has a different context. ‘He’, the subject, is constituted on the exclusion of ‘she’, thus ‘he’ stands for the mark of separation, namely of subjectivity. ‘She’, the singular being, is based on inclusion of ‘he’ and ‘she’ in the sense that ‘she’ is before ‘he’—excluding ‘she’.

Jealousy as a problem and jealousy as an aoria

I will try to explore these questions in their ambivalence and in their equivocation: jealousy as a possible strategy of subjectivity, and jealousy as a possible strategy of singularity. On the one hand, I will consider the strategy of jealousy as the strategy that informs the concept of any strategy; and I will elaborate the strategy of jealousy as the strategy of singularity. However, on the other hand, I will try to develop the question of jealousy as a possible strategy, that is to say, as a strategy present at the very place of the absence of any strategy. In both cases the figure of the other will be unavoidable.

According to what was already mentioned about analysing jealousy as a possible strategy at the very place of any strategy, as the strategy of subjectivity, I believe that jealousy in this context could be presented as a problem (problem of projection, protection). There is no subjectivity without problem. In order for subjectivity to emerge, the subject has to project but also to protect himself; moreover, in order to be a subject, he has to project and protect himself through/from the figure of the other; which means, that the subject, in order to be a subject has to be a jealous subject. The subject in order to be a subject has to have a problem, which is, by the same token, produced within the structure of the subjectivity in order to protect that structure. What I would like to point out is that within this rational, thinkable and, if I could say so, ‘logical’ logic, one circulates around various paradoxes all the time.

Therefore, I would also like to interrogate the notion of jealousy not only as a category of ratio, in the sense that one could understand jealousy as a fear, as a problem, but rather in the course where the notion of jealousy could be understood as a category of mind. My intention is to explore jealousy as a possible category of mind in the sense of being an aoria, or being aporetic experience. Jealousy would then be the category of mind where the unknown guest could always surprise us, but in the mode of not knowing that (one is) surprised. To be surprised by not knowing that one is surprised, by forgetting it (which could be perhaps love), is a kind of impasse: the aoria and aporetic experience of something that is going to happen. With such a question I believe one is at the very place of paradox, or the category of an aoria par excellence. If I succeed in claiming that it is possible to present jealousy as an aoria, it would not be possible anymore to constitute jealousy as a problem, as the limit, or as any kind of border concerning the possession, projection and protection of/from the other. And if it is not possible to constitute jealousy as a problem anymore, then it also means that it is impossible to constitute any kind of problem as such—since with an aoria one is facing the paralysis of what is thinkable and re-presentable, the interruption of the circular structure of the absolute knowledge, the nonpassage, and the ex-position to the other which should not have any limits, or any borders to be crossed. This could mean the possibility to think jealousy as something that will no longer serve as a structure that is necessary for subjectivity to emerge in the sense of a projection and protection of the subject, but jealousy as an experience of what is coming and going to happen.

What is one of the most important questions, considering the topic of this paper is—how is it possible to think jealousy in relation to the singular being, the being that is unique in the sense of not being an individual and autonomous being in order to be a being? Furthermore, following this context I would like to pose another question: considering the notion of jealousy in relation to the concept of singularity, is it possible to decide if jealousy as such is related, and if it is, in which sense, to the question of sexual difference? Could one relate, and if yes, how, the concept of singularity, the concept of the ‘singular being’—the being which is by her displacement, by her exposition to the other and thus by her constant ‘break’ (of the heart) that what it is to jealousy? Although defined as the absence of any strategy, can a singular being be jealous? And if it can, in what possible sense? Is a singular being, thanks to the absence of any strategy, a non-jealous being? Or, perhaps it is possible to see the very place of the absence of any strategy as the strategy par excellence?

Is it not necessary that there should be non-strategy, non-thinking, non-politics, non-presentability, non-language, non-appropriation non-jealousy, in order to be a strategy, a thinking, a politics, a presentation, a language, an appropriation, a jealousy? And then, is the singular being singular at all?

Irreplaceability

Singular being is endlessly substitutable, each one for the other, each one for all the others. She is in-different and anonymous. Singular beings are ‘coming and going’. Birth/death are each as the other. Since the singular being depends on nothing, she is an absolute. But at the same time that she depends on nothing means that nothing can complete her. In that sense, a singular being is a fragment. A fragment that can never be completed in herself. It is thus, an absolute fragment. What singularizes a singular being is the communication with each other in her irreplaceability. Their irreplaceability, although they do not have access to it (and the same goes for the irreplaceability of the others) is the very place of their singularity. The singular being cannot appropriate her own irreplaceability or the irreplaceability of the other. Nevertheless, the irreplaceability of one, the same as the irreplaceability of the other, or the irreplaceability of the others, is for the singular being being-with-the-others. By being with the others already already, by being with the others as being with nobody, singular being is being that is always ex-posted being ex-post and exposition ex-post. By being ex-posted, and exposition ex-posted, the singular being is a being that is always already a being towards the other, in the sense that the other, or the others of the other, always already comes ‘before’ a singular being and therefore it makes it possible, although never completed. The singular being is a fragment that can never complete herself in herself, since she is always already the other by being constantly ex-posted to it. In that sense, a singular being is always coming and going from one to the other. Thus, the singular being loves. For the singular being existence is love, or to say it differently, for the singular being thinking is affirmation, thinking is inclusion of the otherness of the other; thinking is saying yes, again yes to the other and to the otherness of the other. Thinking is as loving and thinking is as translating.

Moreover, if a singular being is a being, and nothing more or nothing less, she should have a heart. Or more strongly: she should be heart. She should ‘beat’ as a heart beats. If it is still possible to talk about something like the essence of (a singular) being, it is
something like the heart, although always already the broken heart, and only in that sense the heart. Singular being is constantly repeating "yes, I am here". "Yes, I am here and I am responding to you." By responding to the otherness of the other, singular being reaches the concept of the responsibility. In that sense, by constantly saying yes to the other, singular being is thus responsible for her responding, affirming, loving and welcoming the other in his/her otherness.

In this respect, one of the questions that this text is posing is -who and what as the other's might arrive to the "singular being" since it could be anyone or anything. Hence, unexpected. Hence, always in a form of a surprise.

The absolute arrival is not even a guest. He surprises the host. He surprises the one who is exposed by being always already a response of the other, or by being always already a response of the absolute arrival.

I believe that this constant possibility of arriving of the absolute arrival could be, perhaps, the place for us to explore how and in which sense one can argue about the possibility of a singular being being jealous.

When one is speaking about the absolute arrival the question that immediately appears is: in this arriving of the arrival, in this arriving of the event, and in this arriving of the otherness of the other -who is the host and who is the guest?

"But if the new arrival who arrives is new, one must expect -without waiting for him or her, without expecting it- that he does not simply cross a given threshold. Such an arrival affects the very experience of the threshold, whose possibility he thus brings to light before one even knows whether there has been an invitation, a call, a nomination, or a promise (Verheusing, Heißen, etc.) What we could here call the arrival, the most arrival among all arrivals, the arrival par excellence, is wherever, whatever, in arriving, does not cross a threshold separating two identifiable places, the proper and the foreign, the proper of the one and the proper of the other....

Speaking about the absolute arrival, the host is not the host since in order to be an arrival he/she should be neither awaited nor expected. And what about the guest? The guest, as arrival, as a new guest, in order to be "new" should not be a guest at all, since there is no host for such a guest. In a way, the host becomes a guest and a guest becomes a host.

The guest, the host, in its singularity that does not separate identifiable places, could be any other in its otherness, where the other is thought as a person, as nation, as race, as class, as language, as the world.

Hence, a singular being cannot neither 'protect' or 'project', nor save her identity. Being a pure openness, a singular being is always possibly the other whom she does not know and does not expect. In that sense, as it was mentioned above the singular being is the one that is exposed and ex-position exposed to any new arrival, to any otherness.

A singular being is a being that is 'coming and going', but, also a being that is coming as going and going as coming. In that sense, the singular being is the being that is always already 'both sides' of any border of any limit, and of any end; thus, the singular being is the very place where there are no more borders, no more limits and no more ends. Her ex-position is not anymore a position. In this sense, she is beyond any position, which also means that she is not any position. Precisely because she is never in opposition, she does not have a position and vice versa since she does not assume any position, she does not know any position. This does not mean a reversal of the symbolical hierarchy between man and women; it also does not mean a phantasmatic imposition of an exclusively female homosexual paradise. Woman is here introduced as another name for the multiplicity of

sexes that corresponds to the multiplicity of desires, instead of the traditional concept of sexuality based on a desire in which lack is always already inscribed. I am opting for multiplicity of bodies and pleasures. In this sense a woman, a singular being is related to any position in the form of relation without relation. A singular being is pure openness and experience as such. Present in its presence; nothing behind and nothing in front; thus, a singular being is as such an a priori. She is constantly open, but since it is impossible to open something that is always already open, she is closed.

I would like to recall here a question of sexual difference; What about sexual difference considering singular beings? I would like to state that in the concept of singularity sexual difference (understood traditionally as a difference between only two identifiable sexes) is not inscribed. I would also like to recall a few already mentioned characteristics of a singular being. It is anonymous; it is everyone, it is not necessarily human, it is not a part of any order and consequently does not know any differences. Nevertheless, I would say, if one insists on the existence of sexual difference, then the singular being is a woman, but a woman that is not anymore opposed to the man, thus a woman as a 'hitherto' place of subversion of sexual difference. In this sense, one is not talking about the woman as the one that is opposed to man as his/her other and thus as a constituted (sexual) difference in the sphere of rationality and knowledge, but rather about a woman whose other is not anymore man but the other's other. Any/other. Every/other. An anonymous other in its otherness.

And I am claiming this because I believe that the place of woman is not a place and a position but rather an ex-position. That the woman is the one who is being 'on both sides' of any border, and thus is a being capable of the interruption of what is knowable. Consequently, she is by that very gesture of being able to interrupt the structure of the knowable, of the possible, on the side of what is knowable not knowing it, as well as on the side of what is knowable although without knowing it. Thus she produces the a priori, or that is to say, she is an a priori herself, as the result of renouncing any structure, any border and any limit, of renouncing any end.

Did I lose my trace of a singular being's possible jealousy? Or, did I lose my trace of her jealousy, as I decided to place, but not to posit, singular being as female. I believe that I did not. Without mentioning the term jealousy, we are at the very place of singular being's jealousy; at the place that is not place, at the position that is not position, at the relation to the other that is a relation only and as much as it is not. But that is a relation that comes "before" any position, that comes before "me" and before "you". Precisely because of her openness, because of her coming and going from one to another, and because of her ex-position, one could perhaps talk about jealousy of a singular being. About jealousy that in this case represents a kind of necessity of relating oneself to the other. About jealousy, which is also in its uniqueness and in its singularity never completely and fully translated, but rather translated.

'love-mare'

"All people do not die in the same way.
Throughout time, they have not died in the same way".
(Derrida, 1993, p. 43)

Ever since I decided to work on the issue of jealousy I have been asked if I consider the notion of jealousy as necessarily related to the notion of love. All these various versions of
the same question might be reduced to the following ones: Can one be jealous without love? Or, a similar question but nevertheless not the same at all—is there any jealousy without love? Or, perhaps, is there any love without jealousy? I had great difficulties in answering these questions although I was answering them in a way all the time. I was answering them even before I was asked; although real difficulties appeared together with these concrete and direct questions. I was answering all these questions through thinking and translating the notion of jealousy as such. I was answering them through constantly translating the notion of jealousy from my native (Serbian) language. The word for jealousy in Serbian is ‘ljubav’—more. What I would like to point out is that, to my knowledge, there is no other language where the word love (‘ljubav’) appears as inscribed in the notion of jealousy. The only similarity that I could find with other languages was with the German term for jealousy—Eifersucht. Although, the difference is still great. The German term ‘sucht’ implies something similar to the notion of ‘mora’ in the Serbian version of the term. But still, it is not ‘mores of love’ at stake, but rather the German term implies something like an illness, or even more madness caused by the affects and passion.

The literal translation of the Serbian term for jealousy is ‘love-mare’. And as it is, for example, with the ‘night-mare’, one does not ask oneself, or one cannot easily answer the question, since one cannot apprehend such a question: is ‘night-mare’ necessarily related to ‘night’ or not? Is it a ‘mare’ because it is a ‘night’, or is it a ‘night’ because ‘night’ as such implies always already a kind of ‘mare’?

Let us return to Derrida’s remark from the beginning of this paragraph: If, as Derrida suggests, culture is always a history of dying, the culture of dying, apprehension of death, exchanging death or living death through translating from one (language) to another, exchanging and thus translating death—it is possible to ask what kind of culture (of dying) it is, or how one dies in the language, in the history of dying, and in the culture, which is named as the Serbian language and Serbian culture? And how one exchanges that death, or that culture of death in translating jealousy as a ‘love-mare’? Or, in translating ‘love-mare’ as jealousy? And then, how one exchanges, generally speaking, death in thinking and re-thinking jealousy as a translation from one language to another language? In its coming and going from one language to another? How does one die in a language and culture, wherein love is necessarily inscribed in the notion of jealousy? And then, how one does translate and thus cross the border (of death) of such a term where love is necessarily inscribed in jealousy? Can one ask—isn’t love as such always (possibly) a mare? And if it is so, what kind of mare is one speaking of? The mare of impossibility? The mare of perhaps, possible impossibility? Possible because impossible? Or even, the mare of, perhaps—the impossible because possible?

What, perhaps what else could be said about it at this point in my work is that while translating from one (Serbian language) to another (the English language) and in this particular case the word ‘ljubav’—love (mora)—translating it as the term ‘jealousy’, it appears that in this process of translating I have discovered that the process of translating as such retains all these possible ambiguities, considering translating any one to any other in this case, language. Thus thinking as translating and translating as thinking the term (changing and ex-changing one death for another) the concept of jealousy becomes that very place of the aporia: a paralyzing moment of rationality, hence calculability, hence circularity of thinking. It becomes the place that is dis-placed, the more as timeless in the sense of constant ‘coming and going’: the place where jealousy as such disappears as a problem. In translating, is it possible that I have experienced this voyage, this passage that is erasing the border between presence and absence, where presence becomes absence and absence becomes presence? Did jealousy, as such, while translating it to the other (language) seduce me and exposed me to the aporia, or to the aporetic experience or— to the experience as such.

Another question that imposes itself on me reads as follows: is jealousy only that thing that concerns living beings? Since jealousy as such appears as translation, and thus as a passage, a trespass, from one to the other, from presence to absence and from absence to presence, ‘coming and going’ from one to the other, can one ask if perhaps the death are also jealous? One has great difficulties giving answers to such questions, because, I believe, such questions face us with the ‘mare’ of the paradox, or with the ‘mare’ as paradox, or perhaps with the ‘mare’ of the aporia? And thus, one is faced with a kind of impasse. Furthermore, do all these questions lead us somewhere, or are they the first sign of the already mentioned ‘paralysis’ of thinking, or paralyses of what is thinkable? Do these questions lead us to the border where one faces the non-thinkable, the border that is thus even not a border anymore, at that point where one is unable to think anymore—the point of the non-dialectical passage from one to the other? (Nancy, 1997, p. 10). The passage from one to the other that is not anymore its, and thus the opposed other, but rather the other that is not anymore its other but the other’s other? Is the most frightening point—the non-logical, non-reasonable, ‘mad’ point—where something arises from its antithesis, where the possible arises from the impossible, life from death and death from life, where truth arises from error, where love arises from non-love?

If the other which comes and cuts across me is the other language, that means perhaps, that one is thinking in one language as always already being cut and crossed with the other language, which could mean that one is always already thinking in several languages. Thus, thinking again appears as translating. But what breaks the heart of one (language) in crossing with the other (language)? Blanchot’s remark:

One would like to think, each time, in a single language, which would be the language of thought. But finally one speaks as one dreams, and one often dreams in a foreign tongue: it is the dream itself, this time, that makes us speak in an unknown speech, diverse, multiple, absolute in its transparency... (1997, p. 149)

In the process of translating from one to another to become jealous (in the sense of jealousy translated as a ‘love-mare’), of not being capable of not loving and being open towards the others; therefore, one is always trembling in front of the otherness of the other (language), precisely because what ties us to the other in his/her otherness is what is closest to us. Perhaps, what is closest to the heart. Perhaps, that is love. In this sense, one can think about jealousy understood as an unavoidable urge of destining oneself to the other: of jealousy as an unavoidable urge of having a broken heart, and thus having a heart, of jealousy understood as not being capable not to be always already ex-posed to the other. Of jealousy understood as love for the other in his/her otherness although it is always possibly a ‘love-mare’? In other words... (but it is a matter of nothing but that, other words).

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