

THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND EVIDENTIALITY. DIALECTAL AND DIACHRONIC VARIATION IN *SE VE QUE*

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ABSTRACT

The sequence *se ve que* can convey various meanings: indirect physical perception, cognitive perception and evidentiality. The latter value, however, is restricted to European Spanish, and is especially frequent in the Eastern Area. From a diatopic perspective, the existence of ambiguous uses of *se ve que* can be acknowledged where speakers can interpret both a perceptual and an evidential meaning of the structure. Thanks to a diachronic study and to the analysis of ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous uses, this article postulates further recognition criteria that help distinguish between perceptual and evidential meanings of *se ve que*. In this sense, the study shows that the trait shared by perceptual and evidential values —and the one leading to ambiguity— is the fact that they are based on one and the same reasoning process, and the difference between them —that may help distinguish them— lies in the part of the reasoning process that is being cognitively focused. Likewise, the article shows how a deeper study of *se ve que* can contribute to a better understanding of evidentiality in Spanish.

KEYWORDS: evidentiality, perception, *se ve que*, diatopic variation, diachronic variation.

LES FRONTERES ENTRE LA PERCEPCIÓ I L'EVIDENCIALITAT. VARIACIÓ DIATÒPICA I DIACRÒNICA EN *SE VE QUE*

RESUM

La seqüència *se ve que* pot tenir diversos significats: percepció física indirecta, percepció cognitiva i evidencialitat. El darrer valor, tanmateix, es restringeix a l'espanyol europeu i és especialment freqüent en l'àrea oriental peninsular. Des d'una perspectiva diatòpica, l'existència d'usos ambigus de *se ve que* es pot reconèixer quan els parlants poden interpretar tant un valor perceptual com evidencial. L'estudi diacrònic i l'anàlisi dels usos ambigus i no-ambigus que presenta aquest article permet postular criteris més afinats per a distingir entre els valors perceptuals i evidencials de *se ve que*. En aquest sentit, l'estudi mostra que el tret que comparteixen els valors perceptuals i evidencials és el fet que es basen en el mateix procés de raonament, la qual cosa també els condueix a l'ambigüitat. En canvi, la diferència entre ells es troba en la part del procés de raonament que es focalitza cognitivament, i això pot ajudar a distingir-los. En definitiva, aquest estudi en profunditat de *se ve que* pot contribuir a entendre millor l'evidencialitat en castellà.

MOTS CLAU: evidencialitat, percepció, *se ve que*, variació diatòpica, variació diacrònica.

0. INTRODUCTION¹

The study presented below analyses the diversity of meanings of the form *se ve que* in a set of geolectal varieties of Spanish and offers a diachronic explanation for such diversity. Recent studies suggest that there is an evidential value in the Spanish sequence *se ve que* (Cornillie & Gras 2015, Albelda 2016a, Briz 2016, González Vázquez 2016, Marcos Sánchez 2016, Albelda & Jansegers 2019, Figueras 2019). Nevertheless, as the following sections will show, this evidential value, which accounts for more than 90 % of the uses of *se ve que* in Spanish from Eastern Spain (Albelda & Jansegers 2019), is absent in the majority of Spanish-speaking geographical areas (Albelda 2016, Albelda & Jansegers 2019).

On the basis of a corpus study, the article that follows has three main aims, which will be addressed, respectively, in sections 1, 2 and 3:

1. Presenting the inventory of values of *se ve que* and providing a map of how these values are distributed in a set of geolectal varieties of Spanish, both in European Spanish (where Eastern varieties will be compared with the rest of mainland Spanish) and American (where, for historical and technical reasons, Cuba-Havana and Mexico, both Monterrey and Mexico City, have been selected). Special emphasis will be placed on finding the evidential value of *se ve que* in each geographical area studied.
2. Correlating the different geolectal distribution of the values (perceptive and evidential) with the historical development of *se ve que*. It will be shown that the evidential values are the latest and that they arise in Spain, and thus:
 - a. the evidential values derive from non-evidential ones, and
 - b. since evidential values appear later, and only in Spain, they lacked the opportunity to be transplanted to America.
3. Starting from ambiguous or neutralization examples of *se ve que*, in which perceptive and evidential interpretations are possible, obtained in dialectal and historical corpora, we aim to provide new means to distinguish between purely cognitive-deductive values and full-fledged evidences. This, in turn, allows us to gain knowledge on how evidentiality works in Spanish.

1. GEOLECTAL VARIATION OF *SE VE QUE*

Our first aim is to account for the geographical distribution of the sequence *se ve que* in Cuba, Mexico and Spain, particularly regarding its perceptive and

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evidential values (indirect physical perception, cognitive perception, indirect inferential evidential and indirect reportative evidential). To do so, section 1.1 presents the literature on the discussion of the polysemy of *ver* ('see') and the sequence *se ve que*; section 1.2 examines the criteria for the identification of these perceptive and evidential values in real corpus data; sections 1.3 and 1.4 present, respectively, the corpora considered in our study and the results of the analysis of the four values in each geographical area.

1.1. *Se ve que* in present-day Spanish

According to previous studies (Willems 1982, Fernández Jaén 2012, Antolí 2017, among others), the verb *to see* expresses not only direct physical perception but also indirect physical perception, cognitive perception and evidential values. Except for direct perception ("*se ve una escalera en la foto*" ['A ladder can be seen in the picture']), which only appears in non-propositional uses, the rest of the values can also be expressed by the sequence *se ve que*, as will be shown below.

Indirect physical perception involves inferential processes in the speaker's mind that are generated from visual external stimuli, more specifically, percepts of a physical nature. However, unlike direct physical vision, in this case the perception is indirect. This indirection is correlated with the form since the percept is propositional (*se ve que*); that is to say, it introduces a sentence complement (Willems 1983, Hanegreefs 2008, Fernández Jaén 2012). Example (1), an excerpt of a colloquial conversation from Havana, depicts the *indirection* of perception, i.e. the inferential process of the speaker that is intrinsically present in indirect physical perception. In (1), the speaker has ocularly seen the construction of an industrial park in the town of Mariel and, from what he sees, he mentally processes that the construction works are reaching their finishing phase. In other words, he *sees* some construction works, but he *concludes* and expresses the phase of the project in which they are at the moment of speech:

- (1) B: eh / Alain / ¡cómo se ven las construcciones del Mariel!
 C: sí / es... porque eso está en el Mariel
 B: sí
 C: por fuera [...]
 B: pero *se ve que* lo que están es... acabando // Candela
 A: el puerto
 B: de todo ahí pegado a la- al mar.
 (Corpus Ameresco Cuba-La Havana, Cub.H.21, lines 131-139)
 'B: [...] the buildings of Mariel look astonishing!
 C: yes / is ... because that is in the Mariel, right?
 B: yes
 C: outside [...]
 B: but *you can see that* what they are doing is ... finishing [...]
 A: the port

B: everything there so close to the- to the sea.²

Cognitive perception, on the other hand, appears in those cases in which perception is totally mental, the reasoning not based on a visual stimulus but on previous knowledge or assumptions. As has been studied (Albelda & Jansegers 2019), cognitive perception can be realised in two ways: either it is an intellectual apprehension of an abstract reality, or it is the result of an inference of the speaker based on his knowledge of the world and logical reasoning. The first case is only possible when *se ve* introduces stimuli (*states of affairs*; Boye 2009) and not propositions. That is, the intellectual apprehension of an abstract reality is only possible with the structure *se ve*, without the conjunction: “Para mí ese es el momento crucial de la fiesta, donde *se ve* ∅ la responsabilidad de la gente” [‘for me, that is the crucial moment of the party, the moment when the responsibility of the people can be seen’]. On the contrary, in the sequence with the conjunction (*se ve que*) the cognitive perception comes from a reasoning process. See example (2):

- (2) A: él me decía que los empresarios contratan a chicas porque siempre quedan mejor / a la gente le gusta más / yy yo le decía / “hombre pues si van a comprar mujeres / yo creo que a una mujer antes le gustará un chico que no una chica” / no pero / él me lo rebatía / diciendo que no / que una chica siempre lo hace más aseado
 B: ¡qué va! // es una tontería enorme // *ahí se ve que España es machista a tope* y de ahí no va a salir nunca / la verdad. (Corpus PRESEEA-Castellón, Interview 26, p. 543)
 ‘A: he used to tell me that employers normally hire girls because they always look better / people like it better / and I used to say / “man, if the clients are women / I think a woman will like a boy better than a girl” / no but / he was refuting me / saying that it’s not like that / that a girl always works much better
 B: No way! // It’s a huge nonsense // *there you can see that Spain is macho to the fullest*, and will never change / that’s the truth.’

In example (2), the speaker B uses *se ve que* to express a conclusion and evaluation of a fact that he has drawn from the previous speaker’s explanation and example.

Together with the two values in (1) and (2), centred on the lexical and conceptual meaning of perception, *se ve que* also expresses evidential values. Although some authors claim the existence of visual evidence (direct sensory evidence) in the verb *see* (Bermúdez 2005; Whitt 2010; Kotwica 2017, 2019; Antolí, 2017), in this article we will discard it since it coincides with the value of indirect physical perception. The studies that support this type of direct sensory evidentiality accept that, in languages not typologically evidential, like Spanish, the lexical value of vision is in itself a source of information and, therefore, has an evidential value. However, given that one of the objectives of this paper is

² The translation of examples into English offer different equivalents for the sequence *se ve que* in an attempt to express the slight nuances of meaning.

precisely to investigate the emergence of evidential (and therefore grammatical, according to Aikhenvald 2004)³ nuclear meaning, the lexical evidential cases would interfere with the objective of the investigation. Thus, only the purely grammatical (in the case of Spanish, only indirect) modes of knowledge will be considered evidential, be they inferential (example 3) or reported (example 4).

When *se ve que* is evidential, the inferential mode of knowledge seems to be the most frequent. Albelda (2018) finds out that 70 % of the cases of evidential *se ve que* express an inferential mode of knowledge, either circumstantial (based on observable stimuli), or generic/conjectural (without the support of sensory data). The latter is the value expressed in the following excerpt from a colloquial conversation recorded in Valencia, Spain:

- (3) J: por cierto↑ la / laa Miriam esa↓ ¿se llama Miriam / la hermana de Verónica?
 A: sí↓ creo que sí
 J: que se ha quedado más tapón / tío
 A: ¡coño! / es que ella es bajita
 J: ya / no↓ es que sus padres *se ve que* son bajitos / no lo sé.
 (Corpus Valesco 2.0, Conversation 14, interventions 66-70)
 'J: by the way, that girl, Miriam. Is 'Miriam' Veronica's sister's name?
 A: yes, I think so
 J: well, she's a midget / man
 A: well, her sister's also short
 J: yeah... / no, *apparently* her parents *must be* short / I don't know.'

Speaker J makes a conjecture about the reasons why Miriam, the person they are talking about, is a *midget*: their parents must be short. In fact, at the end of J's third intervention, the lack of certainty of J's opinion is explicit ("I don't know"), so we can understand that J does not rely on any empirical data to make such an inference.

The reportative knowledge mode of *se ve que* is less frequent than the inferential evidential value. In example (4), the informant I recounts an act of childhood mischief based on what she has been told, probably by her parents, to whom she refers in the previous intervention. In this case, *se ve que* acts as a reminder of the verb *contar* in "me lo han contado", uttered previously, as well as many other marks of reported information that are offered underlined in example (4). The speaker here indicates (in co-reference with the *verbum dicendi*) that the source of information is external to the speaker and that the latter knows this information via reported discourse:

- (4) E: ¿y cuando eras pequeña te decían que eras así muy traviesaa / o sea tenías fama de traviesa?
 I: pues no me acuerdo / la verdad / mis padres siempre me han dicho que era un bicho / de travesuras: no es quee...

³ There is a traditional debate concerning the grammatical or lexical nature of evidentiality. In this paper we will consider evidentiality as a grammatical category following Aikhenvald (2004).

E: ¿alguna vez has hecho algo así?

I: pues mira / una me acuerdo que me lo han contado // o sea que no recuerdo haberla hecho que dice que- estaba en el colegio yy [...] una vez me subieron a la clase de mi hermana y resulta que entonces tenían tinteros encima de la mesa // [...] para escribir / para poner tinta // entonces que fui y *se ve que* sin querer pues tiré un tintero y en lugar de ir y decírselo a la profesora pues me fui corriendo y me escondí. (Corpus PRESEEA-Castellón, Interview 58, p. 1159)

'E: and when you were little, you were told that you were, like, so very naughty? / or did you have the reputation of being naughty?

I: well, I do not remember / to be honest / my parents have always told me that I was terrible / I mean, regarding mischiefs, it's not that ...

E: have you ever done something like that?

I: well / I remember they told me // (I do not remember having done it) that- I was at school and and [...] once they got me into my sister's classroom and it turns out that they had inkwells on the table // [...] to write / to put ink in // then, they say that I went there and, *apparently*, unintentionally I threw an inkwell and, instead of telling the teacher, I ran and hid.'

In short, the sequence *se ve que* can express these three values. However, a first approach to the real data of corpus has shown that the classification in one of these values can be problematic: Some cases seem to be somewhere in between the perceptive values (sensorial and cognitive) and the evidential ones. Obviously, talking about ambiguity is only relevant for speakers who have all the values of *se ve que* available in their lexicon/construction; section 1.4 will show how the evidential value is only registered in Spain and, therefore, only Spanish speakers would be able to find ambiguous examples. More precisely, the ambiguity being discussed can be seen in two intersections: first, between the inferential evidential value and the cognitive perception (example 5); second, between the inferential evidential value and the indirect physical perception (example 6).

In the moment prior to example (5), speaker A has argued that her boss is very rich; now she illustrates his richness with a fact: he once paid her dog's veterinarian the same amount of money he pays the speaker (his employee) for a week's salary. In A's second intervention, A uses the structure *se ve que*, in which both an evidential and a cognitive interpretation fit the context. The ambiguity, as we will further explain in section 3, is generated by the fact that cognitive perception and inferential evidence generate from the same reasoning process, but they focus on two different parts of this process. From a few perceptive stimuli or from previous knowledge, *se ve que* in (5) presents a conclusion, that is, the *result* of reasoning: here, it is concluded that 'from the data reported, the inference is made that the dog was very dear to the owner', and the fact of having provided explicit data (spending a remarkable amount of money on the dog) reinforces the validity of the conclusion.

- (5) A: [...] una vez un perrito que le diagnosticamos moquillo / se gastó tres mil pesos en ese rato / y yo así... / a mí eso me pagan en una semana (RISAS)

B: tres mil pesos en una semana
 A: pues *se ve que* lo querían mucho
 B: y se murió pero bueno.
 (Corpus Ameresco Mexico-Ciudad de México, Méx.EC.1, lines 214-219)
 'A: [...] Once a puppy that we diagnosed distemper / [the owner] spent three thousand pesos at that time / and I was like this ... / that is what I am paid in a week!
 (LAUGHS)
 B: three thousand pesos in a week
 A: Well, *it looks like / apparently* it was a very loved dog.'

Example (6) is similar to (5) in the fact that two possible interpretations exist: together with the evidential value, indirect physical perception can also be interpreted. In I's third intervention, *se ve que* could be an inferential circumstantial evidential (from a set of sensorial stimuli based on their behaviour, the inference is made that they are poor) or it could be a visual perception gleaned by the speaker when he comes across them:

(6) I: ellos este... / no trabajan / y tienen un carro / del año / bien bonitos
 E: ¡ah! / ¿cómo le hacen?
 I: porque muchas veces este / les dan estampías / y ellos las venden
 E: ¿de veras?
 I: y es contra la ley / pero ellos acá por otro lado / a su amigos / a ellos se las venden más baratas / ee / *se ve que* tán muy- muy pobres.
 (Corpus PRESEEA-Monterrey, Interview ME.HM334, lines 501-57)
 'I: t / ...erm..., they don't work, and (yet) they have / car... modern... very nice
 E: ah! How can they live?
 I: because many times erm... people give them stamps and they sell them
 E: really?
 L: and it's against the law, but they here sell them to their friends, they sell them them cheaper... erm... *apparently / it is noticeable that* they are very- very poor.'

For a Mexican Spanish speaker (see §1.4), examples (5) and (6) could only be interpreted as instances of cognitive perception; for a European Spanish speaker, who is naturally acquainted with the evidential value of *se ve que* and uses this value relatively often, (5) and (6) can be seen as neutralizing contexts, where both evidential and perceptive interpretations are possible. The present study, as noted before, aims in part to provide tools that help explain the differences between perceptive values —where the lexical meaning of visual perception (be it physical or mental) is preserved— and evidential values with “grammatical” meaning, which convey that the information given comes from an inferential source.

1.2. Criteria for the identification of the evidential value

In accordance with what was stated in the previous section, the values that have been discriminated in the sequence *se ve que* in the corpora searched (presented below in §1.4) are schematised in the following graph:

PERCEPTIVE, NON- EVIDENTIAL	i. Indirect physical perception ii. Cognitive perception
EVIDENTIALS	iii. Indirect inferential evidential (subtypes: circumstantial, generic and conjectural; Squartini 2008) iv. Indirect reportative evidential

Image 1. Values of *se ve que*

In the perceptive values of *se ve que*, the nuclear meaning is of a conceptual nature. They convey the meaning of vision, physical (i) or mental (ii). On the other hand, the recognition, of a grammatical nature, of the evidential value is more complex in languages like Spanish, where evidentiality is not grammatical. The literature on the subject has shown a great diversity of positions on the status of evidentiality in Spanish (see, for example, González Ruiz *et al.* 2016, Figueras & Cabedo 2018, Estellés 2018). Precisely this hesitation in its characterization, together with the already-mentioned collision with perceptive values in some contexts of neutralization, justifies the need for a better discrimination between them, which is one of the objectives of this work. However, before doing so, the features must be summarised that have been presented up to now by the literature as essential for the recognition of the evidential value in a linguistic form of *vision*:

- The meaning must be grammatical and, therefore, the meaning of *vision*, be it physical indirect or cognitive vision, must have disappeared. In principle, this semantic requirement is linked to a formal expression: pure evidentiality in Spanish is associated with parenthetical forms, already fixed as discourse markers (as *al parecer* or *por lo visto*) or in the process of being fixed, when they have only some parenthetical uses (*está visto (que)*, *se ve (que)*: “En el hospital el niño no reconocía bien, *se ve*, a su madre” [‘in the hospital the boy did not recognised well, apparently his mother’]).⁴
- It has to point to the source of information; therefore, it has a deictic component. In that sense, according to Whitt (2010), it is not a description and satisfaction of the act of vision, by which the question “what do you see?” could be answered. It is rather the indexing of the source or evidence by which some information is known, which answers the question “how do you know that?” (Kotwica 2017, 2019).
- One of the requirements for the expression of evidentiality in non-evidential languages, such as Spanish, is the fact of introducing propositional scope (Boye 2010, 2012; Kotwica 2017, 2019). The concept of *scope* points to the content affected by the meaning of a form, and, in the

⁴On the parenthetical uses of the verb *ver* in Spanish, see Albelda (2016a), Kotwica (2017).

case of linguistic expressions of *vision*, two possible scopes are distinguished: scope over propositions (“either as a meaning unit with a truth value or as a conceptual representation construed as referring”, Boye 2010: 5); and uses that do not introduce propositions but states of affairs (conceptual representations of the facts of the world for which no evidence can be provided, and no truth value can be assigned, because they do not express any external referent, Boye 2010: 6). In the case of Spanish evidentials, the fact of containing the conjunction *que* assures the introduction of a sentential structure, and *se ve que* is no exception (compare it with *se ve que* + direct object, without *que*).

- Following Anderson (1986), two interrelated criteria can be applied for the recognition of evidentiality. The first criterion states that evidentiality is expressed in syntactic-semantic *realis* contexts. Thus, for the recognition of the evidential value, it is seen that the *irrealis* contexts, such as presuppositions, counterfactuality, condition, imperatives, negation, etc., are discarded. According to the second criterion (Anderson 1986: 274), closely related to the above, an evidential form cannot be part of the predicate; it is rather a specification added to the event being described. Thus, the sentence “Se ve una escalera en la foto” [lit. ‘It is seen a ladder in the photo’] can be negated by saying “No se ve la escalera” [‘the ladder cannot be seen’]. One could also substitute the verb for *apreciar* or *observar*, for example, while in “Se ve que sin querer tiré un tintero” [‘unintentionally I threw an inkwell’], (in example 4), the possible negation would only affect *un tintero* (“#no se ve que sin querer tiré un tintero”).

The aforementioned restrictions should make it possible to separate evidential uses of *se ve que* from the other conceptual uses. However, as has been said before, these tests are still insufficient in some contexts, and still some ambiguous examples exist, the classification of which is not clear. Operationally, to determine that a case is ambiguous, a switching test has been applied. It has been considered that the value of indirect physical perception is substitutable by *se aprecia*; the cognitive perception can, in addition to the first, be replaced by *se nota* (but not vice versa); and the evidential could be substituted by either of the other two evidential markers of Spanish: *al parecer* and *por lo visto*. Thus, a form will be considered ambiguous if both the evidential markers and the two substitutes of perception (*se nota* and *se aprecia*) are admissible in the context.

Finally, regarding the subtypes of indirect source of knowledge in evidentials, previous studies show that *se ve que* can express both reportative and inferential sources. Pure reportative evidence (verbatim reproduction of words) is very rare in our corpus (see §1.4). Instead, there are mainly reportative uses that also contain an inferential component (*nonfirsthand*; Aikhenvald 2004);

therefore, these uses have been computed together with pure inferentials.⁵ On the other hand, within the category of inferential evidentials, several subtypes of inferentiality have been distinguished. Squartini (2008) proposes a gradient of inferentiality from more to less presence of external stimuli in the reasoning. His classification includes circumstantial, generic and conjectural inferences. In the latter, the reasoning is based exclusively on internal logic, and inferences are generated without any external support. Generic inferences are a combination of the reasoning of the speaker and of external information coming from universally-shared knowledge. In circumstantial inferences, external stimuli perceived by the speaker are the departing point from which speakers carry out a reasoning process. To these subtypes delimited by Squartini (2008), as has been said above, we add nonfirsthand evidentials, where an inference is produced from a previously-uttered verbal stimulus.

The cases of ambiguity show that the value of circumstantial inferential evidentiality tends to compete with that of indirect physical perception, whereas generic and conjectural evidentiality are closer to cognitive perception.

1.3. Corpus collection

For the study of diatopic variation, our aim has been to analyse which of the four previous values (indirect physical perception, cognitive perception, indirect inferential evidential and indirect reportative evidential) are registered in each geographical area. There has not been a study of the frequencies of each value because the quantification exceeds the scope of this paper; it has simply been verified whether or not the values are registered in the corpora analysed, and, therefore, whether or not the values are present in the geographical areas represented by the corpora. Only in the case of the evidential values has it been considered informative to study its frequency; the previous literature and a first approach to the corpora shows a different density of use in the areas where the evidential value exists.

Regarding the dialectal areas studied, four geographical areas of Spanish have been selected:

- a) In Europe:
 - i) Eastern Spanish (where the bibliography indicates the highest frequency of use)⁶
 - ii) Rest of Spain

⁵ On the correlation between nonfirsthand and inferential evidentials, see also Estellés (2018, 2020).

⁶ This high frequency is related, according to González (2005), to the presence of the parallel form of Catalan *es veu que*, bearing in mind that the Eastern area of Spain is either bilingual in Spanish and Catalan (Catalonia, Valencian Community, Balearic Islands) or is historically highly influenced by Catalan (Aragon, Murcia, Eastern Andalusia, Eastern Castilla-La Mancha).

b) In America:

- i) Cuba
- ii) Mexico

The comparison could be extended to more Spanish-speaking areas in the future, but the selection of the American areas in (b) for this study serves two main purposes: on the one hand, they are considered different dialectal areas (Lipski 1996, Granda 1999), and, on the other hand, they present technical advantages in accessing oral corpus data.

In order to carry out an interdialectal study, a comparable corpus of study of each zone has been compiled. The first difficulty in achieving this purpose is the lack of oral corpora: Not all the dialectal areas of Spanish have oral corpora available, and those that have do not necessarily include the same genres or registers. Given that the literature ascribes the highest frequency of evidential uses to Eastern Spanish, the available oral corpora in the Eastern area have been taken as the reference point, determining the searches in the rest of the zones and the subsequent comparison between them.

The oral corpora available in Eastern Spanish belong to two different genres, namely free-wheeling conversation and semi-(in)formal interviews.

- a) Conversation: Val.Es.Co. corpus of colloquial conversations from Valencia (Briz & Grupo Val.Es.Co. 2002, Cabedo & Pons n.d.); corpus COJEM from Palma de Mallorca (Méndez Guerrero 2015); corpus COGILA from Granada (Barros *et al.* 2012);
- b) Interviews: Corpus of sociolinguistic interviews [PRESEEA project] from Valencia (Gómez Molina *et al.* 2001, 2005, 2007), Castellón (Blas Arroyo 2010) and Granada (Salvador 2007, Moya 2007).

Regarding the rest of Spain, most oral corpora available have been considered for this study. Those corpora have been selected that a) are publicly accessible and b) contain samples of the two genres (conversation and interview). The corpora analysed are:

- a) Conversation: La Coruña (Eslora, n.d.), Madrid (Corma, Enghels *et al.*, n.d.) and Seville (Fuentes *et al.*, n.d.);
- b) Interviews: La Coruña (Eslora, n.d.), Madrid (MCNCH, Samper *et al.* 1998), PRESEEA-Alcalá (Moreno *et al.* 2002), Seville (Fuentes, n.d.), PRESEEA-Málaga (Lasarte *et al.* 2009), Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (MCNCH, Samper *et al.* 1998).

In America, the corpora considered are:

- a) Cuba
 - i) Conversations: Ameresco-La Habana (González Mafud, n.d.)
 - ii) Interviews: PRESEEA-La Habana (PRESEEA, n.d.).
- b) México
 - i) Conversations: Ameresco-Monterrey (Flores Treviño, n.d.) and Ameresco-Mexico City (Various authors, n.d.)

- ii) Interviews: PRESEEA-Monterrey, PRESEEA-Mexico City, Mexicali and Guadalajara (PRESEEA, n.d.).

In total, the synchronic corpus compiled contains approximately 4.443.500 words. The distribution of words per area and per discourse genre is illustrated in the following tables:

	Corpora	City	Number of words
EASTERN SPAIN	SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS	Castellón	575.000
		Valencia	420.000
		Granada	168.000
	CONVERSATIONS	Valencia	350.000
		Palma de Mallorca	120.000
		Granada	36.000
	Total		

Table 1. Oral corpora from Eastern Spain considered for this study

	Corpora	City	Number of words
REST OF SPAIN	SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS	La Coruña	639.000
		Málaga	160.000
		Madrid	40.000
		Sevilla	40.000
		Las Palmas de Gran Canaria	69.000
		Alcalá	160.000
	CONVERSATIONS	La Coruña	8.500
		Madrid	360.000
		Sevilla	14.000
	Total		

Table 2. Oral corpora from Spain considered for this study (excluding Eastern Spain)

	Corpora	City	Number of words
CUBA	SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS	La Habana	120.000
	CONVERSATIONS	La Habana	135.000
	Total Cuba		

Table 3. Oral corpora from Cuba considered for this study

	Corpora	City	Number of words
MEXICO	SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS	Mexico City	63.000
		Monterrey	855.000
		Mexicali	69.000
		Guadalajara	63.000
	CONVERSATIONS	Mexico City	23.000
		Monterrey	107.000
	Total Mexico		1.180.000

Table 4. Oral corpora from Mexico considered for this study

1.4. Results: Geographical distribution of *se ve que*: Perceptive and evidential values

The results of the analysis of the corpora collected are shown below. The sequence *se ve que* can be found in all the geographical areas studied. However, the evidential meaning of the form *se ve que* diverges strikingly from one area to another. While the values of indirect physical perception and cognitive perception are present in all the areas studied, the evidential value has only been found in corpora from Spain. In addition, a different distribution is revealed within Spain, as shown in the following tables:

	Corpus	City	Hits	Cases/total of words	cases/100.000 words
EASTERN SPAIN	SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS	Castellón	55	55/575.000	9,57
		Valencia	10	10/420.000	2,38
		Granada	4	4/168.000	2,38
	CONVERSATIONS	Valencia	61	61/350.000	17,43
		Palma de Mallorca	6	6/120.000	5,00
		Granada	4	4/36.000	11,11
	Total Eastern Spain		140	140/1.669.000	8,38

Table 5. Results of *se ve que* in Eastern Spanish

	Corpus	City	Hits	Cases/total of words	cases/100.000 words
REST OF SPAIN	SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS	La Coruña	2	2/639.000	0,31
		Málaga	1	1/160.000	0,62
		Madrid	2	2/40.000	5
		Sevilla	1	2/40.000	2,5
		Las Palmas de Gran Canaria	1	1/69.000	1,45
		Alcalá	2	2/160.000	1,25
	CONVERSATIONS	La Coruña	0	0/8.500	0
		Madrid	1	1/360.000	0,27
		Sevilla	0	0/14.000	0
	Total rest of Spain			10	1.330.500

Table 6. Results of *se ve que* in Spain (excluding eastern zone)

The evidential uses are non-existent in the corpus of Cuba and Mexico; in Spain, they are ten times more frequent in the Eastern zone than in the rest of the territory. The data provided in tables (5) and (6) show this difference in frequency: 8,38 cases per 100.000 words in Eastern Spain versus 0,75 in the rest of the country.

Considering the intrinsic limitations of all corpora, especially oral ones, and given the limited data that has been obtained from Cuba, a decision was made to expand the sample. It has also been expanded with the objective of ruling out that the previously recorded nonexistence of evidential value in Cuba and Mexico may be due to the limitations or characteristics of the collected sample. To do this, we have gone to other non-oral corpora, but they present large data samples. Specifically, we have looked for *se ve que* in the Corpus of Spanish (Mark Davies) and in the corpus CREA of the Spanish Language Academy.

After analysing the uses of *se ve que* in both Spanish reference corpora, again no evidential values have been registered, only perceptive ones. Thus, a much larger sample seems to reinforce that the form *se ve que* does not express evidential value in the American varieties studied (at least, in the corpora studied). These evidential values, non-existent in Cuba and Mexico, are present in European Spanish, and within Spain there is a significant quantitative difference between areas. In the Eastern zone, evidential uses are ten times more frequent than in the rest of Spain (tables 5 and 6): there are 8,38 cases per 100.000 words in Eastern Spanish versus 0,75 per 100.000 words in the rest of the European dialects of Spanish. Notwithstanding the above, in the analysis of these last two reference corpora, as well as of the previous corpus compiled for this

work, ambiguous cases have been found in the Spanish of Cuba and Mexico, as indicated in section 1.1. It is precisely these cases —see a sample in example (7)— that will allow us to observe the differences and similarities between ambiguous and purely evidential values, in order to deepen the characterization of the evidential value and to justify a possible connection between the perceptual and evidential values.

Example (7), from Ameresco-La Havana, seems to be very close to an evidential value, while it also allows a second perceptive interpretation:

- (7) A: ¿tú sabes que Laura está faja conmigo?
 B: ¿Laura es tu mejor amigueta?
 A: mi prima / porque a ver / verdad que cuando llego a mi casa nunca voy a verla / [...] el problema es que yo cuando voy a mi casa primero que lo que estoy son tres minutos en mi casa [...] y se los tengo que dedicar a mi mamá y a mi papá / porque imagínate tú / tengo cosas que hablar con ellos / no sé qué / si me voy con Laura me voy a hablar de chismes por ahí / [...] y ayer ella llegó / entró y dícame “mijita *se ve que* con las glorias se olvidan las memorias” / no sé qué / me saludó / buscó una cosa que le hacía falta y se fue. (Corpus Ameresco Cuba-La Havana, Cub.H.14, lines 356-389)
- ‘A: Do you know that Laura is mad with me?
 B: Laura is your bestie?
 A: My cousin. Because, ok, it’s true that when I arrive at my house I never go visit her [...] the problem is that when I go to my house, firstly, I am there three minutes at most in my house [...] and I have to dedicate those minutes to my mom and dad, because, you know, I have things to talk about with them, and so on. If I go with Laura, I’m going to talk about gossip and the like [...] and yesterday, she came in and told me “‘mijita’, *apparently* when in glory, the memories are forgotten”, and so on, she said hello, looked for something she needed and left.’

In “entró y dícame ‘mijita, *se ve que* con las glorias se olvidan las memorias””, *se ve que* (‘apparently’) is placed in a segment of reported speech. A cognitive perception value can be understood if *se ve que* introduces an intellectual reality that was apprehended mentally by Laura, stated in this moment of speech. On the other hand, an evidential value could be understood if the words uttered by Laura to recriminate A’s past behaviour were only expressed as a possible hypothesis and explanation of A’s conduct, according to Laura. Both interpretations fit here. Section 3 will go deeper into the aspects differentiating ambiguous or borderline cases between perceptive and evidential value.

2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE VALUES OF SE VE QUE

As has been observed in the previous section, only two of the four main values of *se ve que* are present in all the varieties studied, at least according to the corpora examined. Two of them, the evidential-inferential and evidential-reportative

values, are absent in the corpora of Mexico and Cuba, and (especially) the reportative evidential type is scarce in non-eastern European areas.

The different geolectal distribution is usually a consequence of historical development. Therefore, we have searched a historical corpus to obtain a preliminary overview of the evolution of *se ve que*. A search was made in the *Corpus Diacrónico del Español* (CORDE, Spanish Language Academy), with no genre or country restrictions. The number of examples obtained reached a total of approximately 2.100 occurrences.

According to the results of CORDE corpus, all of the values of *se ve que* presented in the synchronic analysis were already present in the past and with the expected territorial differences, only in different proportions. The least frequent examples are those with pure indirect visual perception: those with no cognitive nuance in them. In this sense, see the contrast between examples (8) and (9):

- (8) para demostrar, así mesmo, que las circunferencias puestas en una mesma superficie con la vista parecen líneas rectas, traía estas razones [...] Porque el plano que junto al ojo se pone a manera de línea recta, éste no le puede ver por no caer en él ninguno de los rayos que salen del ojo, pero su extremidad *se ve que* es línea recta. (CORDE, 1585, Onderiz, Spain)

'To demonstrate, likewise, that the circumferences placed on the same surface look like straight lines at sight, I brought these arguments [...] Because the plane is placed next to the eye in the manner of a straight line, this one (the ray) cannot see it, since none of the rays that come out of the eye fall in it, but its extremity *is seen to be* a straight line.'

- (9) Era mi posada enfrente del Santo, que así llaman a San Antonio de Padua por antonomasia, cuya iglesia y grandioso sepulcro es digno de más bien cortada pluma. Esta casa o palacio era en un tiempo de un senador, cuando Padua era república, y *se ve que* era grandiosa con sus hermoeadas plazas de suntuosos palacios adornadas. (CORDE, 1607-1645, Duque de Estrada, Spain)

'My inn was in front of the Saint, which is what they call Saint Anthony of Padua par excellence, whose church and grandiose tomb is worthy of a rather cut pen. This house or palace belonged to a senator once, when Padua was a republic, and *it can be seen that* it was magnificent, with its beautiful 'piazze' full of sumptuous ornate palaces.'

Example (8), a treatise on mathematics, states that it can be seen that the endpoint is a straight line. Therefore, here the visual component is prominent. In contrast, although (9) has a strong visual component (the narrator describes the view from the inn he occupied), there is also a cognitive component, since from the visible characteristics of the city of Padua at the moment of writing, the narrator deduces that it was magnificent in the past.

There are, however, cases of exclusive cognitive value, in which the vision would be, if not totally, at least mostly absent.

- (10) REY: ¿Ha dado luz a tus ojos
mi sobrina Aurora, hija
de Dión?
FILIPO: Fue tan prolija
la ausencia a que los enojos
me desterraron de Egisto,
que con tu padre privó,
que jamás lo permitió.
REY: Bien *se ve que* no la has visto,
pues ignoras la ocasión
de tormento tan esquivo.
(CORDE, 1620, Ruiz de Alarcón, Mexico)
- 'King: Has she given light to your eyes, my niece Aurora, daughter of Dion?
Philip: The absence to which the anger from Aegisthus banished me was so neat that [...] he never allowed it.
King: It can well *be noticed that* you have not seen it, since you ignore the occasion of so elusive a torment.'

In (10) the conclusion that Philip has not seen the daughter does not derive from anything that the king may be seeing at that moment; rather, he deduces this from the ignorance of Philip, manifested through his words. Note, moreover, how the verb *ver* 'see' appears twice, with its two meanings ("bien *se ve que* no la has *visto*"), the first purely cognitive, and the second sensory and not a part of the form *se ve que*.

The undoubted evidential cases, although much scarcer, are also registered in the corpus. One case is example (11):

- (11) Manolo, en serio, yo no soy una chafardera, pregunta a quien quieras, pero también se habla de ti y de esa chica tan antipática, la Hortensia, la sobrina del Cardenal, siempre estás metido en su casa, ¿qué te dan?, aunque yo creo que no es por ella, sino por su tío y los asuntos que os traéis entre manos, vaya tío raro ése también, *se ve que* pasó algo entre él y Luis Polo, aquel chico gallego que iba en tu pandilla y que dicen que la policía le pilló robando en el coche de un extranjero mientras tú escapabas de milagro, eso dicen en el barrio. (CORDE, 1966, Marsé, Spain)
- 'Manolo, seriously, I'm not a gossip, ask whoever you want, but people also talk about you and that nasty girl, Hortensia, the Cardinal's niece, you're always at her place, what do you get there? Although I think it's not because of her (they are talking), but because of her uncle and the issues that you both have in hand; what a weird guy that one, too, *apparently* something happened between him and Luis Polo, that Galician boy who was in your gang and who was caught by the police stealing in the car of a foreigner, while you escaped by miracle, that's what they say in the neighbourhood.'

In (11), the speaker deduces that something must have happened between the Cardinal and Luis Polo, but it is not visible (it is not a case of indirect physical perception), nor is it the result of a reasoning process based on solid and explicit argument bases (as we will see in section 3); rather, the fragment affected by *se ve que* seems to have a certain conjectural component on the part of the speaker, and

there is a lack of absolute certainty that something has happened between them. This example is a fairly clear instance of the inferential evidential value.

Although it is not the purpose of this paper to carry out a diachronic study per se of the form *se ve que*, it is convenient to mention some results from CORDE that can explain some of the data provided in section 1 and endorse some of the hypotheses that will be presented in section 3. According to the data in CORDE, the perceptive values, both visual and cognitive, coexist from the first attested documents. The first occurrence of the form in the corpus, in fact, is from the late fifteenth century, and it is closer to the cognitive value than to the purely visual one. However, the ambiguous values between perception and evidentiality are not registered until modern Spanish, from the eighteenth century on. The undoubtedly evidential values, on the other hand, do not appear until very late (towards the middle or end of the 19th century), always coexisting with all the previous values, which have not been lost in Spanish. In addition, the evidential examples that are found in the corpus belong only to Spain; thus, the CORDE corroborates the geographical distribution of the evidential values proposed in section 1.

Regarding the formal characteristics of *se ve que*, they have also varied over time. Changes can be observed in the elements with which *se ve que* is combined, as well as the scope and position of *se ve que* within the fragment. One of the most striking aspects –explored later in section 3– is the strong presence of explicit elements that syntactically modify the content introduced by *se ve que*, usually circumstantial complements. In general, until the 18th century, a high percentage of occurrences incorporate one of these modifiers or circumstantial elements; sometimes these fragments explain where or why this information can be seen or understood as it is; in other words, they state what the bases are of the conclusion that is presented by *se ve que*. This is the case of example (12a-d), where there are anaphoric forms (“en las cuales se ve que”), deictic adverbs (“aquí se ve que”) or even more precise indications (“en la observación 3 [...] se ve que”). In other cases, a modal or epistemic reinforcement of the conclusion cooccurs with *se ve que*. This adjunct may be the only existing adjunct, as in example (12e), or it can be concomitant with the previous adjuncts, as in (12b-d):

- (12) (a) Pues ¿qué diré de las planetas, en las cuales se ve que ninguna deja de dar y de recibir sus influencias [...]? (CORDE, 1548, San Francisco de Borja, Spain)
 ‘Well, what shall I say about the planets, in which it is seen that none of them stops giving and receiving their influences [...]?’
- (b) [...] instituidos de los gentiles en honra de sus falsos dioses (que por este título bien se ve que son detestables, y que los debe huir el cristiano) [...]. (CORDE, 1589, Ribadeneira, Spain)
 ‘[...] instituted by the Gentiles in honour of their false gods (by this title it is well seen that they are detestable, and that Christians must flee them) [...].’

- (c) “Mis pies y manos rompieron / y sobre las ropas mías / echaron suertes”: aquí / bien se ve / que habla el Psalmista / de los tormentos que dio / rabioso a los israelitas / Faraón. (CORDE, 1623, Ruiz de Alarcón, Mexico)
 “My feet and hands broke, and on my clothes, they cast lots”: here it can well be seen what the Psalmist tells about the torments that the raging Pharaoh inflicted to the Israelites.’
- (d) [...] en la observación 3, distinta i claramente se ve que el rei le mandó entregar el régimen i gobierno [...]. (CORDE, 1753, Mayans i Síscar, Spain)
 ‘[...] in observation 3, it can be clearly and distinctly seen that the king ordered him to render the regime and government [...].’
- (e) [...] sólo pudo formarla tu entendimiento, bien se ve que sólo fue la empresa de tus talentos [...]. (CORDE, 1689, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Mexico)
 ‘[...] only your understanding could form it, it can well be seen that it was only the result of your talents [...].’

The concurrence with adjunct segments of this type does not disappear with time (in fact, in the 20th century, the presence of these adjuncts is still the majority in CORDE). However, it is interesting that, fundamentally from the 18th century on, two associated phenomena occur: on the one hand (example 13a), these adjuncts which constitute, so to speak, either the base or the reinforcement of the conclusion presented are displaced from the previous position to the posterior position of *se ve que*; on the other hand (examples 13a and 13b), the *se ve que* begins to be found at the beginning of the period.

- (13) (a) Trabaja. ¿Cómo no trabajar, si en aquella soledad terrible el trabajo es un consuelo, sin el cual se volvería loco, como atestigua la experiencia? No intenta fugarse. ¿Cómo intentarlo, cuando, completamente aislado, se siente débil y no tiene instrumento que pueda utilizar para su fuga ni medio ninguno de proporcionárselo? No procura comunicar con sus compañeros de infortunio. ¿Cómo procurarlo, cuando sabe que es imposible [...]
Se ve que aquí todo es necesario; que cuanto hace el recluso no puede menos de hacerlo; que sin aparente violencia hay fuerte coacción material; que la resistencia es imposible, y, por lo tanto, la obediencia se ignora si será voluntaria. (CORDE, 1877, Arenal, Spain)
 ‘He works. How not to work, if in that terrible loneliness work is a consolation, without which one would go mad, as experience shows? He does not try to escape. How to try it, when, completely isolated, he feels weak and has no instrument that he can use for his escape, or any means of getting one? He does not try to communicate with his companions in misfortune. How to procure it, when it knows that it is impossible [...]
It is seen that (apparently) everything is necessary here; that what the prisoner does, he got not any other option than doing it; that, without apparent violence, there is strong material coercion; that resistance is impossible, and, therefore, obedience is ignored if it is voluntary.’
- (b) El Papa continúa su método empezado; trabaja día y noche, no se explica con nadie, ni se puede penetrar cómo piensa en la mas mínima cosa: de todos desconfía, sin haber hasta ahora manifestado la mas mínima parcialidad por

ninguno. *Se ve que* desprecia altamente todos sus ministros, altos y bajos [...]. (CORDE, 1769, Azara, Spain).

'The Pope continues his newly started method; He works day and night, he does not explain himself to anyone, nor can anyone penetrate in the way he thinks about the slightest thing: he mistrusts everyone, without having even shown the slightest partiality for anyone. *It is seen that (apparently)* he highly despises all his ministers, high and low [...].'

Although the fact of beginning the sentence period must be taken with some caution, given that the punctuation of the examples is, to a large extent, the editor's decision, nevertheless the change is already evident (and reliable) in the cases of the 18th and 19th centuries, like in (13a), where *se ve que* also starts the paragraph. In this same example, the bases of the conclusion headed by *se ve que* can be seen in the parallel fragment of the previous paragraph, but also in the later fragment, which is an elaboration of the previous idea.

The passage from examples like (13a-b) to others like (11) can be seen as a typical case of conventionalisation of an invited inference (Traugott & Dasher 2002): those examples with a high degree of explicitness of the bases of the conclusion (as in the case of 12d) do not disappear, but the examples in which the degree of specificity is lower (or its recoverability in the context) become increasingly common in the corpus. Thus, the basis of the conclusion is more specified in (12d) than in (12e), where the conclusion is not indicated as such, but the reader infers that the basis of the conclusion is the previous fragment, the one affected by *se ve que*. As these examples become generalised, cases like (13a) are found, wherein it is unclear which of the two fragments, former or latter (or both), supports the conclusion.

As a result, *se ve que* progressively becomes more abstract: there is a change in its meaning, from physical or cognitive vision to new grammatical values present in the context from which it has been detached: the basis of reasoning in its more schematic version. This evidences the existence of a reasoning process, whatever the specific arguments are that support this reasoning. Thus, evidential *se ve que* starts encoding the procedural instruction by which the affected fragment must be understood as the result of a reasoning; the bases of this conclusion are not known, or they do not come to the case, or they can only be recovered (again) inferentially. We will expand this last point in section 3, where we will delve into the implications that both corpus studies have for the study of *se ve que* and to set the frontiers of indirect evidentiality in general.

3. BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND EVIDENTIALITY IN *SE VE QUE*

The analysis of the synchronic and diachronic corpora shows that ambiguous cases present an interference between one of the two perception values (indirect physical or cognitive perception) and inferential evidentiality. Therefore, the

delimitation of their boundaries should focus on the analysis of the values (i) and (ii) versus (iii):

- (i) Indirect physical perception
- (ii) Cognitive perception
- (iii) Inferential indirect evidential (circumstantial, generic, conjectural)

Some authors have considered examples (5) (“*se ve que lo querían mucho*” [‘it looks like it was a very loved dog’]) and (6) (“*se ve que están muy pobres*” [‘it is noticeable that they are very poor’]) as evidentials (Whitt 2010; Kotwica 2017, 2019; Antolí 2017). These are precisely the cases that have been considered ambiguous here; they fulfil one of the prerequisites (presented in §1.2) to be considered evidential, namely having propositional scope, but they do not fulfil the rest of the prerequisites: they express no grammatical meaning, are not indexical, and so on. In this sense, were the perceptive uses in (5) and (6) considered evidential, they would show a peripheral kind of evidentiality. Therefore, it is necessary to discard them, or at least to add more criteria to recognise evidentiality. The following lines are devoted to this latter task.

First, let’s review the definition of cognitive perception offered in §1.1. According to the literature, cognitive perception is the result of an inference made from a reasoning. However, this definition can be applied equally to cases of inferential evidential *se ve que*. In the fragment “*se ve que lo querían mucho*” in example (5), the speaker reaches this conclusion after a series of arguments: spending a large amount of money on a dog is an argument that allows one to conclude that the subject loves the dog. In a similar sense, in a clearly evidential case such as (14), the speaker comes to the conclusion that a cabinet has been moved from its normal place by hints, among which is the fact that a plug that normally reaches the socket no longer easily reaches it:

- (14) G: se necesitará una alargadera
 E: no↓ llegar llega / lo que pasa que es que *se ve que* se ha corrido un poco el armario... mira a ver / que no cuadra. (Corpus Val.Es.Co. 2002, Conversation J82.A1, lines 218-221)
- ‘G: we’ll need an extension cord
 E: no, it is long enough. What happens is that *it is seen that (apparently)* the closet has been moved a little ... just look, it does not fit.’

Therefore, example (14) shows that this first definition, ‘the result of an inference made from a reasoning’, is not enough to discriminate the two values unless the nature of the reasoning process undoubtedly shared by both is better understood.

The main difference between the values of the previous example (5) and the ones in (14) lies not so much in the type of mental process as in what part of that process is cognitively focused. As will be shown below (and as the result of the historical process pointed out in the previous section), while cognitive perception focuses on the discursive bases and the content of the conclusion itself, so as to

verify a result of reasoning, the evidential focuses on the very existence of a reasoning process. In other words, in the evidential, the arguments do not matter that much: the speaker only indicates that his or her words are the result of a reasoning, the bases of which may not even be known. Formally, there are differences between one type and another: while in cases of cognitive perception the arguments that lead to the conclusion are usually explicit or clearly accessible, the opposite is the case in evidentials. The latter are incompatible with the explicit presence of the discursive bases. Let's go back to the previous example (2), renumbered now as (15):

- (15) A: él me decía que los empresarios contratan a chicas porque siempre quedan mejor / a la gente le gusta más / yy yo le decía / "hombre pues si van a comprar mujeres / yo creo que a una mujer antes le gustará un chico que no una chica" / no pero / él me lo rebatía / diciendo que no / que una chica siempre lo hace más aseado

B: ¡qué va! // es una tontería enorme // *ahí se ve que España es machista a tope* y de ahí no va a salir nunca / la verdad. (Corpus PRESEEA-Castellón, Interview 26, p. 543)

'A: he used to tell me that employers normally hire girls because they always look better / people like it better / and I used to say / "man, if the clients are women / I think a woman will like a boy better than a girl" / no but / he was refuting me / saying that it's not like that / that a girl always works much better.

B: No way! // It's a huge nonsense // *there it is seen that* / 'you see that' Spain is macho to the fullest, and will never change / that's the truth.'

The degrees of explicitness of the bases can vary between those of (16), where *ahí* ('there') is a direct reference to A's intervention, and those of the previous example (5), wherein the basis is the previous intervention of the speaker herself, but there is no formal linkage mark beyond the mere contiguity of the utterances. This can be compared with example (16), wherein the speaker tells a passage from the movie *Dirty Dancing* in which one of the characters is practiced a clandestine abortion:

- (16) Entonces ya, cuando vuelven del baile, pues, a la rubia le están practicando el aborto. Y *se ve que* el que se lo estaba practicando era un inexperto y no tenía ni idea y la había hecho polvo por dentro. Entonces Baby llama a su padre, que era médico y... y le dice que hay alguien que lo necesita de noche. (Corpus Habla Culta de Granada, Interview X, p. 160)

'Then, when they return from the dance, the blonde girl is having an abortion. *And it is seen that (apparently)* the one who was practicing it was an inexperienced guy, and he had no idea, and he tore her inside. Then Baby calls for her father, who was a doctor and ... and tells him that there is someone who needs him at night.'

The speaker of (16) justifies the arrival of the doctor (Baby's father) because "*se ve que* el que se lo estaba practicando era un inexperto y no tenía ni idea y la había hecho polvo por dentro" [*it is seen that* the one who was practicing it was an inexperienced guy, and he had no idea, and he tore her inside']; however, this

is not *seen* (physically) during the film. It is a conclusion to which Baby arrives when she breaks into the scene, sees the patient and hears the comments of the people present. Viewers, of course, have no more data than Baby about the scene, and they follow the same reasoning process as Baby. The bases of the reasoning are not present in (16) because they are unimportant. The only relevant fact is that the information presented by the speaker of (16) is deduced by her, who was formerly a viewer of the movie. The actual bases of her reasoning would only be accessible if the hearer had seen the movie.

The importance of the explicitness of the bases of reasoning is clearly reflected in the corpus. In cognitive perception, as shown in the historical study in section 2, the indications that trigger the conclusion are manifested by means of adjuncts as extra-sentential causal adjuncts and phoric structures (like *en esto se ve*, *ahí se ve*, etc.). See example (17):

- (17) Hermosa eres, amiga mía, hermosa eres, tus ojos son de paloma, demás de lo que dentro está escondido: porque esto solamente podían ver los ojos de Dios, no los de los hombres. Por este ejemplo se ve que no tienen razón de quejarse los que dicen que son pobres y enfermos, diciendo que no tienen de qué hacer bienes, ni con qué padecer trabajos por amor de Dios. (CORDE, 1574, Fray Luis de Granada, Spain)
- ‘Beautiful you are, my friend, beautiful you are, your eyes are those of a dove, besides what is hidden inside: because this could only be seen by the eyes of God, not by those of men. By this example it is seen that those who claim to be poor and sick, saying that they have nothing to do good, nor with what to spend hardships for the love of God, they have no reason to complain about.’

In (18), the author refers to an example of the *Song of Songs* that he just quoted, and he states that from this example the conclusion presented below is reached (“no tienen razón los que dicen que son pobres”). As was also advanced in the diachronic study (section 2), the corpus shows that in a majority of the examples prior to the 18th century, there is an explicit mention of the argumentative bases, similarly to (17). In fact, a) when ambiguous perceptive-evidential examples begin to emerge, the explicit mention of the bases start disappearing; and b) the first examples of *se ve que* appear at the beginning of a sentence, as it was seen in (13a), now renumbered as (18):

- (18) El Papa continúa su método empezado; trabaja día y noche, no se explica con nadie, ni se puede penetrar cómo piensa en la mas mínima cosa: de todos desconfía, sin haber hasta ahora manifestado la mas mínima parcialidad por ninguno. *Se ve que* desprecia altamente todos sus ministros, altos y bajos [...]. (CORDE, 1769, Azara, Spain)
- ‘The Pope continues his newly started method; He works day and night, he does not explain himself to anyone, nor can anyone penetrate in the way he thinks about the slightest thing: he mistrusts everyone, without having even shown the slightest partiality for anyone. *It is seen that (apparently)* he highly despises all his ministers, high and low [...].’

In the previous example (18), the information preceding *se ve que* is one among the examples of the Pope's method, but the fact that he despises his ministers does not follow from the foregoing.

A second difference between the types of reasoning in perceptive and evidential *se ve que*, noticeable in the previous examples, has to do with the speaker's access to information (Bermúdez 2005; Kotwica 2018a, 2018b). As long as the argumentative bases of the conclusion are relevant in cognitive perception, they are accessible both to the speaker and to other interlocutors. However, in the evidential case, the access is totally or partially exclusive to the speaker, since the listener is not provided with all the indications that could lead him to confirm the conclusion. Therefore, in the eyes of the listener, there is some conjectural component in the speaker's reasoning.

From the above, it can also be gathered that the speaker's commitment to the truth of the conclusion is much greater in cases of cognitive perception than in those of evidentiality. The analysis of the dialectal corpus in §1 and the diachronic corpus in §2 offers evidence in this regard. In particular, the data seem to conclude that cognitive perception usually coexists with modal formal marks of epistemic certainty (adverbs like *ciertamente*, *claramente*, *notoriamente*, *visiblemente*, *bien*, etc.), while the evidential use usually coexists with marks of uncertainty or ignorance (*no lo sé*, *yo qué sé*, *o algo así*, etc.). This latter is the case in (3), "*se ve que sus padres son bajitos / no lo sé*". Furthermore, the evidential is, to a certain extent, incompatible with the use of marks of certainty: in (16)', it would be impossible to add *claramente* without changing the meaning from evidential to perceptive:

(16)' *Ciertamente se ve que el que se lo estaba practicando era un inexperto y no tenía ni idea.*

'It is clearly seen that the one who was practicing it was an inexperienced guy, and he had no idea.'

When the argumentative bases are explicit, as is the case in perceptual values, the conclusion is reinforced since the elements that would make it valid are provided. In the evidential, where the bases are absent, the veracity of the conclusion is not reinforced since the reasoning process is not the part in focus. Therefore, an element that introduces a conclusion but does not provide the bases that sustain it, could be considered as introducing a weak conclusion, with low commitment from the speaker and, therefore, it is inclined to develop mitigation. In fact, the literature that relates the evidence with the mitigating value is vast (including, among others, García Negroni 2002; Ruiz Gurillo 2005; Fuentes 2009; Martín Zorraquino 2010; Kotwica 2013; Estellés & Albelda 2014; Alonso-Almeida 2015; Albelda 2016a, 2016b; González Ramos 2016; Marcos 2016; González Condom 2018; Figueras 2019).

In summary, the criterion for recognising evidential values in *se ve que* is established in the fact that the cognitive focus is in the process of reasoning, not

in the arguments or in the conclusion obtained from this process. This difference is materialised in that a) the evidential values lack *explicit* argumentative bases, whereas the perceptive ones do not; and b) as a consequence of the above, the perceptive values can be (and are usually) combined with marks of epistemic certainty, whereas the evidentials coappear with marks of ignorance or uncertainty. Another criterion to discriminate between perceptual and evidential values is, in fact, an extension of one of the criteria proposed by Anderson (1986), seen in §1.2: If perception is part of the predicate, while evidentiality is not, the tense of the verb *ver/to see* in the perceptive ones will necessarily have to be the same as that of the reasoning and the discursive bases or clues. On the other hand, in the evidential, the tense of *se ve que* can be present, although the rest of the fragment is expressed in past tense, since *se ve que* introduces a conclusion made at the moment of enunciation and is, therefore, extra-predicative. This can be seen in examples such as (19) (an excerpt from example 4) versus (20), (an excerpt from example 1):

- (19) una vez me subieron a la clase de mi hermana y resulta que entonces tenían tinteros encima de la mesa // [...] para escribir / para poner tinta // entonces que fui y *se ve que* sin querer pues tiré un tintero y en lugar de ir y decírselo a la profesora pues me fui corriendo [...]. (Corpus PRESEEA-Castellón, Interview 58, p. 1159)

'once they got me into my sister's classroom and it turns out that they had inkwells on the table // [...] to write / to put ink in // then, they say that I went there and, *apparently*, unintentionally I threw an inkwell and, instead of telling the teacher, I ran and hid.'

- (20) B: eh / Alain / ¡cómo se ven las construcciones del Mariel!
 C: sí / es... porque eso está en el Mariel
 B: sí
 C: por fuera [...]
 B: pero *se ve que* lo que están es... acabando // Candela
 A: el puerto
 B: de todo ahí pegado a la- al mar.
 (Corpus Ameresco Cuba-La Havana, Cub.H.21, lines 131-139)
- 'B: [...] the buildings of Mariel look astonishing!
 C: yes / is ... because that is in the Mariel, right?
 B: yes
 C: outside [...]
 B: but *you can see that* what they are doing is ... finishing [...]
 A: the port
 B: everything there so close to the- to the sea.'

In (19), the time of the reasoning process coincides with that of the enunciation, but not with that of the story, which is in past tense. In (20), if we try to change to past tense, it would be necessary to alter the tense of *se ve que*. If *se ve que* were maintained in its original tense, after having modified the rest of the verb tenses, a) it would be ungrammatical in Cuban Spanish, and b) in Spanish from Spain, the only possible interpretation would be evidential: the perceptual

value would be lost, and it would be understood as the result of a process of reasoning whose bases we do not know, as can be seen in (20)'.

- (20)' B: eh / Alain / ¡cómo *se veían* las construcciones del Mariel!
 C: sí / es... porque eso *estaba* en el Mariel
 B: sí
 C: por fuera [...]
 B: pero *se ve que* lo que *estaban* es... acabando // Candela
 A: el puerto
 B: de todo ahí pegado a la- al mar.

Ultimately, these requirements serve as a test to differentiate those cases of *se ve que* containing traits that are common to both the perceptive and the evidential types, and that, therefore, favour potentially ambiguous interpretations. The focus on different parts of the reasoning process and the implications of the extra-predictive character of the evidentiality can, in accordance with the analysis provided above, help to establish more clearly the boundaries between both types.

4. CONCLUSION

Returning to the initial objectives, and in response to the first of them: the corpus analysis suggests that the values of *se ve que* appear to be well differentiated in European vs. American Spanish. While European Spanish presents all values, evidential and non-evidential, Cuba and Mexico only show perceptive cases and some ambiguous ones. On the other hand, and in response to objective 2, evidential values arise in the history of Spanish in approximately the 18th century, and they appear restricted to Spain. This final fact would explain the absence of evidential values in the American territories studied.

Finally, and in response to objective 3, all of the above has allowed us to deepen the study of evidentiality in Spanish and, specifically, of the structure *se ve que*. In this vein, having considered the criteria presented to differentiate ambiguous perceptual-evidential cases, let us now return to one of these ambiguous examples, specifically, to example (5):

- (5) A: [...] una vez un perrito que le diagnosticamos moquillo / se gastó tres mil pesos en ese rato / y yo así... / a mí eso me pagan en una semana (RISAS)
 B: tres mil pesos en una semana
 A: pues se ve que lo querían mucho
 B: y se murió pero bueno.
 (Corpus Ameresco Mexico-Ciudad de México, Méx.EC.1, lines 214-219)
 'A: [...] Once a puppy that we diagnosed distemper / [the owner] spent three thousand pesos at that time / and I was like this ... / that is what I am paid in a week!
 (LAUGHS)
 B: three thousand pesos in a week
 A: Well, *it looks like/apparently* it was a very loved dog.'

This example would not be ambiguous for a Mexican speaker (who, according to the corpus, is not familiar with the evidential value). However, for a speaker who has evidential *se ve que* in his or her linguistic inventory, the example has two possible interpretations: the perceptive one (“se nota/es evidente/está a la vista por las palabras previas que lo querían mucho” [‘it is noticeable/evident/visible by the previous words that it was a very loved dog’]), and the inferential one (“al parecer lo querían mucho” [‘apparently it was a very loved dog’]). It is interesting that, without any formal changes between the first and the second value, forcing the evidential reading of the fragment would imply interpretative changes: the fact of spending a lot of money on the dog would be invalidated as an argumentative basis that leads to the conclusion “lo querían mucho”; or, at least, it would invalidate it as the *only* basis, indicating that the speaker has also taken into account other non-explicit bases that we hearers ignore. Changing the verb tense to “se veía que lo querían mucho” would immediately trigger a perceptive reading.

In addition, the nature of the two types of *se ve que* is different as a consequence of the historical process they have undergone, as explained in section 2. As we have seen, in the perceptual value, the focus is on the contents seen or understood, be they in the argumentative bases or in the conclusion, all of which are susceptible to consideration in truth-conditional terms. In the case of the evidential, however, it is the processing instruction that is encoded: the conclusive segment must be seen as the result of a reasoning process. The conclusion is not valued in terms of truth conditions, nor are the bases made explicit. Therefore, the significant nature of the perceptive *se ve que* is solely or mainly conceptual, while that of the evidential is solely or mostly procedural. Thus, the procedural instruction encoded by the structure *se ve que* could be paraphrased as ‘understand the following information to be a result of the speaker’s own reasoning process’.

All of the above, together with the fact that *se ve que* appears very often in parenthetical uses in Eastern Spain, points towards a constructionalisation of the structure as a discourse-marking element with evidential nuclear meaning, at least in the dialects of Spanish from Spain.

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