Imperialism of jackals and lions. The fiscal-military state in Portuguese Africa in the British and French African mirror, c. 1850–1940

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Abstract

We adopt the metaphor of the "jackal" and the "lion" to explore whether variation in geo-political power of metropoles affected fiscal and military capacity building in colonial Africa. Zooming in on Portuguese Africa, we hypothesize that indigenous taxpayers in Angola and Mozambique were forced to invest more in order, security and their own subjugation, as Portugal lacked the wealth, the scale economies, the imperial cross-subsidies and the means of credible deterrence underpinning British and French imperial security policies. We show that military and police force expenditures extracted larger proportions of the colonial budget in Portuguese Africa. The Portuguese African army was also relatively large, relied extensively on forced labour recruitment and remained poorly equipped. While Britain and France supported African colonial armies with substantial metropolitan and imperial subsidies, and Britain also kept far fewer troops on African soil, the conditions of "jackal imperialism" placed greater burdens on long-term colonial state finances.

Keywords: colonial rule, imperialism, Africa, military history, public finance, state formation.

JEL codes: N17, N47, H20, F50, F54.

1. Introduction

An extensive economic and political historical literature explores the rise of the fiscal-military state in the context of the Great Divergence debate. In this debate, diverging fiscal-military capacity building in Western Europe and

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Eastern Asia – Britain and China in particular – is considered one of the primary causes of the growing Eurasian power divide after 1500 (Tilly 1990; Bonney 1999; Yun-Casalilla and O'Brien 2012; Dincecco 2013; Ma 2013; He 2013; Vries 2015). Europe's imperial expansion was underpinned by a combined military and fiscal revolution which, in turn, connected processes of state formation of European metropoles with those in expanding overseas empires (Parker 1987; Hoffman 2015). However, historical studies exploring the link between fiscal and military developments in Europe and state building efforts in colonial Africa are sparse and *comparative* research on this topic is virtually absent (an important exception is Killingray and Omissi 1999). This paper aims to fill part of this void by asking how differences in metropolitan fiscal-military capacity may have affected differences in fiscal-state formation in parts of Africa that were brought under control of Portuguese, British and French colonial governments.[1]

The twin-development of fiscal and military capacity is fundamental to processes of state formation. A state monopoly on the use of violence is a pre-condition for the expansion of a central revenue basis, while state revenues are in turn needed to fund security forces. A critical distinction is that in colonial states, the design of the fiscal-military apparatus is co-determined by the wider imperial system in which the state is embedded, while in sovereign states such global dependencies are not absent, but usually less decisive. Comparative research offers a powerful lens to obtain deeper insights into the political economic context in which colonial governments sought to secure order and finance the state. How did colonial governments approach this challenge and what difference did the financial and military back-up of the metropole make?

We address this question by placing the case of Portuguese Africa in the mirror of British and French Africa. So far, research on comparative "modes" of colonial governance in Africa have focussed largely on the differences between French and British rule. This literature has studied the distinction between direct and indirect rule (Crowder 1964, pp. 197–205); the varying design of legal and judicial systems (Lange 2009); varying approaches to labour and industrial development (Cooper 1996; Austin et al. 2016); varying policies regarding (missionary) education (Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Frankema 2012; Cogneau and Moradi 2014); and variations in administrative and fiscal systems (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014; Frankema and Booth 2019). Yet, Portuguese Africa has hardly ever been considered in any of the mentioned comparative research agendas, while studies on fiscal and military development have remained largely confined to "national" imperial historiographies.

1 An earlier version of this paper is part of Alexopoulou's PhD dissertation (2018).

To be sure, metropolitan differences in the *capacity* to wield hard power have long been acknowledged. Vladimir Lenin already referred to Italian imperialism as *beggar imperialism* or *imperialism of the poor*, arguing that in the scramble for Africa the "weaker" powers (e.g. Italy, Belgium, Portugal) were puppets on a string pulled by the "stronger" powers (e.g. Britain, France and Germany) (Michels 1914; Togliatti 2014). Granting territory to lesser powers was a tried and true method of resolving tensions at the negotiation table and allowed the greater powers to focus on the main prizes (Pakenham 1992). Clarence-Smith referred to these weaker powers as the "jackals" of imperialism, arguing that they had more bargaining power than Lenin and others supposed they had. Clarence-Smith criticized the term "beggars", noting that the weaker metropoles were not necessarily economically backward (e.g. Belgium), and that stronger metropoles were not necessarily economically advanced (e.g. Russia) (Clarence-Smith 1987, p. 94).[2] Others have argued that welfare investments in British colonies were, on average, and also in contrast to French colonies, higher (Grier 1999; Lloyd et al. 2000; Gallego and Woodberry 2010). Some scholars have ascribed the more "benign" features of British imperialism to a cultural or moral distinctiveness (North et al. 2000; Ferguson 2002). But the boundaries between "culture and capacity", let alone between "morality and power", are not so easy to draw. Perhaps lions can afford to be more "benign", precisely because they possess the means to wield hard power?

We adopt the metaphor of jackals and lions to highlight the contrasting geo-political power of Portugal on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. For this study, we define power as *the capacity of a metropole to back up colonial and national interests by military and industrial resources*. We also adopt this metaphor to highlight another aspect of political economy: jackals are clients of lions. The dependence of Portugal on British military assistance and financial capital was demonstrated, amongst others, by the construction of railroads connecting Portuguese and British-ruled territories in Southern Africa, as well in British military support against German threats during WWI. These differences in military power were intertwined with differences in imperial governance "cultures". Portuguese colonial rule in Africa has often been characterised as exceptionally violent and coercive. Its legally supported system of racial discrimination (the *Indigenato*), intensive and prolonged use of forced labour (including forced army recruitment), its long and violent suppression of independence movements and its meagre invest-

2 Marini (1972) elaborated the concept of "sub-imperialism" to point out that states such as China and Brazil were extending control over their own backyards while being subjected to European imperialism at the same time. The Buganda Kingdom is a prominent African example of a polity that used its ties with the British to strengthen its regional position as an imperial power in the late 19th century (Low 2009).

ments in welfare services such as health care and education all testify to this characterization (Wheeler 1969, pp. 425–439; Madeira 2005; Havik et al. 2015; Ball 2015). Later efforts in the post-war era to relax the colour bar, to ratify the ILO forced labour convention of 1930 and to improve the welfare of Africans were made in a context of what some scholars have called "repressive developmentalism" (Cooper 2002, p. 62; Jerónimo 2013, pp. 88, 91).

Our central hypothesis is that the global scale of the British and French empires in the era 1850—1940, rooted in burgeoning industrial economies and related military and naval supremacy, created *two specific advantages* which the Portuguese empire lacked. First, the possibilities to reap economies of scale and scope inherent to the creation of a violence monopoly. When armies operate on a larger scale, they can reduce the average costs of controlling territory by sharing resources, such as training facilities, logistical networks or through a large navy that can patrol a broader area with relatively fewer resources per square mile than a smaller navy. The Portuguese had fewer options to pool military resources in situations of crisis and required larger permanent forces in the colonies to secure internal order. Moreover, Angola and Mozambique were surrounded by "foreign" powers, whereas British and French colonies more often bordered one another. Such potential cost efficiencies also extended to the varying capacities metropoles had to rely on credible deterrence to settle conflicts or disputes before they escalate into a violent confrontation. Put differently, gunboat diplomacy as well as the threat of air force was an option for Britain and France, much less so for Portugal. Such economies of scale also likely involved economies of scope, such as the transfer of specific military skills, experience and technical knowledge, for instance, via the exchange of professional army trainers, logistic equipment or direct military assistance.

The second advantage that the larger empires of Britain and France had was that they contained more pockets of extractable wealth and human resources, thus enlarging the possibilities for metropolitan or intra-imperial subsidies. A prominent example is the implicit subsidy the British empire derived from the Indian army. Indian troops have been deployed in many parts of Asia, Africa and Europe on the account of Indian taxpayers. Another example is that French taxpayers shouldered the financial burden of the colonial army. Specifically, "France spent some 3 percent of GDP on debt service and 4 percent on the army" (Cogneau et al. 2021, p. 450). However, we should not consider this a one-way subsidy, since French colonial armies also relied extensively on the use of coerced labour (Echenberg 1991; Huillery 2014). The most straightforward contrast, however, is the sheer size of the economies of Britain and France in contrast with Portugal, as the latter was not only much poorer in per capita income levels, but also contained much fewer taxpayers to begin with.

If these advantages have played out as we hypothesize, British and French colonial administrations may have been more effective in expanding local tax bases in order to finance the colonial state. This would yield a pattern where structural subsidies from the metropole would be high initially, to be subsequently phased out faster. In contrast, the colonial governments of Portuguese Africa would have had to invest more of their resources into the establishment and maintenance of domestic order and external security if they were to have some leverage at the European negotiation table. This would, in turn, imply that larger parts of the colonial budget in Portuguese Africa had to be reserved for security expenses, that fewer means would be left for welfare expenditure, and that financial back-up from the metropole was required for a longer period of time. More intensive militarization also implied a policy focus on army recruitment and related fiscal incentive structures. To make this work, the colonial army would also have to be ingrained more deeply into the fabric of African societies. In sum, the jackal relies on a different system of securing colonial order than the lion.

This paper develops a systematic comparison to assess the evolution of the fiscal-military state in Portuguese Africa. Our empirical investigation draws on a combination of primary and secondary sources and zooms in on five dimensions of the fiscal-military nexus. We explore differences in recruitment practices and size of the colonial armies in absolute and relative (per capita) terms and compare the per capita military expenditures of Portugal, Britain and France. We compare transfers from the metropoles to Africa that were made to consolidate military control and develop colonial state administrations up to the point that they became fiscally self-sustaining. Using annual series of fiscal accounts retrieved from colonial archives in London and Lisbon, we compare the extent to which military expenses pressed on colonial state budgets. French colonies are left out of the equation here, as military expenditures were nearly fully financed by Paris. We explore the organization of the military and the possibilities of cooperation and intra-imperial exchange of troops. We document how army mobility in Portuguese Africa differed from British army operations in West and East Africa, and the deployment of non-African soldiers at times of crises (e.g. WWI). Finally, we contend that most of the evidence is consistent with the idea that jackal imperialism affected the evolution of fiscal-military states, and that the additional costs of these security investments were diverted to both Portuguese and local African taxpayers.

2. The jackal and the lion

Portugal was the first European nation to explore the West African coast in the 15th century, to erect coastal settlements and to develop trade relations

with African polities. Portugal also became a key player in the transatlantic slave trades, which tied the plantation economies of coastal Brazil closely to its expanding African settlements, especially through Portuguese control over the Atlantic's southern corridor (Miller 1988). Estimates of long-term GDP by Palma and Reis suggest that the Portuguese economy began to experience its relative decline from the mid-18th century onwards (Palma and Reis 2019, pp. 477–506). In the early 1820s, Portugal lost its main Atlantic possession – Brazil – and was pressed by Britain to give up the transatlantic slave trades, which had served as an important driver of its overseas plantation sector. During the scramble for Africa in the 1880s–1890s, Portugal had to rush to occupy the hinterlands of what became Angola and Mozambique, if it wasn't to leave these areas to European contenders. In contrast, Britain's global hegemony reached its zenith during the second half of the 19th century. Britain's industrialization generated vast amounts of private investment capital, sophisticated military and logistic technologies and underpinned an expanding global network of entrepreneurs, governors, bureaucrats, missionaries and military officers.

The British lead over Portugal in GDP *per capita* doubled from roughly 2:1 in 1820 to 4:1 in 1914, while the gap in total GDP rose from 13:1 to 31:1. The gaps with France were smaller, but meaningful nevertheless. GDP per capita estimates place France and Portugal more or less at par in 1820, but in 1914 the ratio had risen to ca. 2.5:1. France having a much larger population, this ratio translated into 18:1 for total GDP.[3] Although these national income comparisons are superficial, the sheer magnitude of the differences point out that the metaphor of the jackal and the lion is no exaggeration. And to further underscore these relative magnitudes: the current gap in GDP between China versus the UK and France is ca. 5:1 and 6:1, respectively.

In 1885, after the Berlin conference, the Foreign Ministry in Lisbon circulated the so-called *Mapa cor-de-rosa* with Portugal's claims in Central Africa (Figure 1). According to the Portuguese government these claims were based on prior discovery, but in the unwritten rules of international diplomacy the jackal had to give in to the lion (Newitt 1997, p. 341). After a series of negotiations and movement of troops in the African interior, Lord Salisbury sent an ultimatum to the Portuguese government in 1890, demanding the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops from the areas where Portuguese and British interests overlapped (Pinto Coelho 1990, p. 173). This ultimatum set the stage for the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1891, in which the borders of Mozambique and Angola were drawn. Portugal held on to some of its African possessions – in addition to several Asian enclaves (e.g. Timor, Macau, Goa) – but it required both British consent and military assistance to sustain its claims.

3 Data from the Maddison Project Database (2020). Accessed 18-03-2024.

The lion left the jackal with two reasonably-sized, but disconnected territories that were bound to be separately administered and secured.

FIGURE 1 ▪ *Mapa cor-de-rosa (the pink map)*



Source: Carta da Africa Meridional Portuguesa. Lisboa: Commissão de Cartographia, 1886.

Britain had stakes in Portuguese imperial trade. Portugal's industrial sector was unable to compete with British export manufactures in foreign markets and failed to develop a sizeable demand for tropical cash crops and raw materials from its African dependencies, except for the cotton that fed into Portuguese textile factories. Instead of catering to colonial markets, or upscaling the production of raw materials for Portuguese factories, colonial policies were focussed on protecting imperial trade flows to skim off the margins involved in re-exports of British manufactures flowing into Portuguese Africa, as well as tropical commodities coming the other way around to end up in major European consumer markets (Lains 1998, p. 239; Clarence-Smith 1985, pp. 172–176). Colonial railways were largely constructed by British companies and a big part of the plantation complex was under control of British-owned concession companies. Meanwhile, the profitability of Portuguese companies that were invested in crops such as rubber, coffee and sugar hinged on the widespread use of forced labour (Jones and Gibbon 2024).

While the territorial divisions on the European drawing table became visible in the early 1890s, securing de facto control over these areas took much more time. Portuguese invasions in the Angolan hinterland had long been concentrated on slave trade related conflicts and the establishment of com-

mercial outposts. Major territorial conquests started after 1885, with wars in the South against the Ovambo, spreading to the Bie Plateau in 1902 in the centre of the country, where the Ovimbundu revolted against oppressive labour conditions and Portugal's interruption of the rubber trade. After a particularly severe campaign the Portuguese defeated the Dembos in the North, but it was only in 1920 that the colonial government could claim to have "pacified" the entire country that we nowadays refer to as Angola (Bender 1980, p. 138).

In Mozambique, the *prazo*-holders played a leading role in the organized resistance against Portuguese penetration.[4] The *prazeiros*, who had dominated the Zambezi area – the central zone of Mozambique – from the 16th to 19th centuries, had accumulated wealth in the slave and ivory trades, but had also obtained land titles (*prazos da coroa*). The *prazeiros* used private slave-soldiers *(chikunda)* to secure their property and collect taxes. Although military slavery was not uncommon in pre-colonial Africa, these *prazo*-armies were exceptional in that African slaves were serving the interests of creolised settler families (Isaacman and Peterson 2003, pp. 257–260).[5] Portuguese campaigns in the Zambezi valley had begun in 1869, but only with the support of British forces did the Portuguese manage to break the resistance in the 1890s. The central regions of Manica and Sofala were handed over to large concession companies, such as the Companhia de Moçambique and Companhia de Zambezia. These companies were dominated by British capital and focussed on plantation agriculture. The former also obtained a charter that allowed the company to tax and police local inhabitants and to (forcibly) recruit African labour. This form of colonial governance through semi-private companies resulted in a patchwork of administrative systems in Mozambique, whereas in Angola, a more integrated and centralised fiscal and military administration emerged (Azambuja Martins 1939, pp. 570–571; Alexopoulou and Juif 2017, p. 226 and 245).

3. Building a colonial army

The colonial armies in Portuguese Africa initially consisted of a first-line force of European soldiers, varying in numbers up to 2,000 men, and a larger second line of African auxiliary and irregular forces known as *guerra pre-*

4 Originally the *prazeiros* settled as delegates of the Portuguese Crown, but after centuries of intermarriage they developed a degree of autonomy and mixed-race identity that turned them into "the chiefs of the newly emerging African peoples" (Newitt 1969, p. 85; see also Isaacman 1972).

5 The French used African slaves to build up the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, a corps of colonial infantry in French West Africa (Klein 1998; Echenberg 1991).

ta (Wheeler 1969, p. 426). African recruits were mustered by chiefs (*sobas*) who were loyal to the colonial state. The general governors of the colonies set quotas for recruits per province (Arrifes 2004, p. 240). Chiefs were reported to receive 4,500 to 8,000 Reis for each army recruit, the equivalent of 4.5 to 8 Escudos or £1.0 to £1.8.[6] A significant sum in those days. In addition to the recruitment of soldiers and corvée labour, the chiefs also collected hut taxes in exchange for certain privileges, such as tax exemptions. While the Portuguese soldiers were better trained and equipped, the African soldiers remained cheaper to recruit and their susceptibility to (fatal) tropical disease was lower, which infused frequent political discussions about the ideal composition of the colonial army (Oliveira Marques 2001, p. 269).

While the Portuguese navy remained crucial for coastal defence, the number of African ground troops rapidly expanded (Arrifes 2004, p. 64, 197). By the end of the 19th century, only 374 out of c. 8,000 soldiers in the colonial army were registered as "European" (the arrival of expeditionary forces from Portugal during WWI temporarily changed these ratios) (Carrilho 1985, p. 110). The wish to further raise the number of African recruits motivated a major re-organisation of the colonial army, enforced by a decree in 1901 and subsequent regulations in 1904. The 1901 decree entailed a first attempt to systematically organise the recruitment of African soldiers, and to separate the financing of the metropolitan and colonial army regiments (Gata 1952–1953, pp. 41–45). The metropolitan regiments now fell under the Maritime (*Marinha*) and Overseas (*Ultramar*) Ministries and were paid by Lisbon. The colonial regiments resorted under the colonial state and were, at least in theory, to be paid by the colonial government (Arrifes 2004, p. 61). In practice, as we will see below, the strict separation of these financial responsibilities was not so easy to maintain.

Soldiers were classified into four categories. *Voluntários* were skilled workers, such as drivers, carpenters or engineers, who freely joined the army in return for a wage. They usually served for two years. *Contractados* also earned a wage, but were often pushed by local chiefs to sign fixed-term contracts for a minimum of three years, but would not bring specific skills underpinning some bargaining power. *Compelidos* consisted of forced unpaid labour, including penal labour and war hostages, and usually served for four years. Finally, *Recrutados* were forcibly recruited by chiefs or colonial administrators to serve the army, especially in case of an acute war-related rise in demand (Provincia de Moçambique 1904, pp. 9–10; República Portuguesa 1914, p. 6).

The reforms of the colonial army soon received critique as its operational capacity remained very weak. Military officers complained about the lack

6 Observations from Ferreira (1905, p. 1041). Conversion rates from Fontoura and Valério (2001, p. 745).

of proper training and the limited availability of army trainers, about poor military equipment and the fragile discipline of African recruits (Arrifes 2004, p. 250). However, with the Republican take-over in Portugal in 1910, Lisbon sought to grant more autonomy to its colonial states rather than less. The new governor of Angola, Norton de Matos (appointed in 1912), grasped the momentum to propose abandoning the system of forced labour (Janeiro 2015) and forced army recruitment all together, but his views were fiercely opposed by colonial army officials who warned that such measures would shift the burden of imperial defence onto Portuguese soldiers and metropolitan taxpayers (Arrifes 2004, pp. 63–67).

During WWI, Portuguese expeditionary forces were sent in to confront the threat of a German invasion of Angola from the South (German Southwest Africa, now Namibia), and an invasion of Mozambique from the North (German-controlled Tanganyika). The colonial government urged local chiefs to raise the number of recruits, which resulted in tens of thousands of newly enlisted, yet barely trained men (Azambuja Martins 1939, p. 591). Volunteers coming from Portugal had to serve for two years, while Portuguese settlers between 20 and 30 years old had to serve for five years (Arrifes 2004, p. 73). While Portuguese soldiers were deployed in considerable numbers, the exchange of regiments across Portuguese colonies was limited: a handful of Indian soldiers from Goa and African recruits from Angola were part of the early 1869 campaigns in the Zambezi valley (Enes 1946, p.115; Newitt 1997, p. 315). After the consolidation of the Zambezi valley in the 1890s, *companhias* consisting of 118 to 210 men were sent from Mozambique and Angola to the Asian dependencies of Goa, Macau and Timor (Salvagem 1931, p. 591; Coelho 2002, p. 133).

A list of *companhias* dispatched from Mozambique between 1904 and 1932 shows that only one or two *companhias* served abroad at the same time (Azambuja Martins 1939, p. 34). Yet, in August 1914 two were dispatched to Angola, and two went to Timor to replace the troops that had been stationed there in 1912 to supress the Manufahi rebellion – a revolt against attempts by the colonial authorities to impose head taxes and corvée labour. However, the German invasion in Southern Angola required much more than a few hundred poorly equipped *Landims* from Mozambique and was impossible to halt without British support.[7] Moreover, compared to the approximately 25,000 soldiers that were recruited in Mozambique to stall the German invasion of Northern Mozambique from Tanganyika, the movement of troops within the empire had probably more symbolic than practical value.

After the coup of May 1926, António de Oliveira Salazar became the Minister of Finance of the new military regime in Portugal. He started to cut

7 *Landim* is Portuguese for "landrace", which was often used in reference to local cattle and indigenous inhabitants of Southern Mozambique.

back Portugal's military expenses in a larger attempt to curb hyperinflation. Salazar also prohibited any further metropolitan financial transfers to the colonies. In 1932, Salazar became Prime Minister and he proclaimed the *Estado Novo* (also known as the Second Republic) in 1933. His government re-organised imperial defences by introducing a new tax, the *imposto de defesa,* to finance the colonial army (Moreno 1937, p. 13). The moral mission of the colonial army to "nationalise" African soldiers via military training was re-enforced and the conditions of military conscription of Portuguese settlers were tightened (Moreno 1937, p. 4; Azambuja Martins 1939, pp. 64–65).

During WWII and the wars of independence from 1961 to 1974, Portugal became one of the most militarized nations in the world in terms of men under arms. This era falls outside the scope of this paper, but two points are worth making in the context of this study (Coelho 2002, pp. 129–150). First, Salazar continued to focus on the "Africanization" of the imperial forces and thus maintained a long-standing policy objective that was first explicitly formulated in 1901. Second, whereas the militarization up to 1914 was at least partly financed by Lisbon through grants-in-aid, these grants were turned into loans during the 1920s and consequently, as we will see below, debt servicing expanded as a category of government expenditure in Angola as well as Mozambique.[8]

4. Colonial army recruitment and intra-imperial mobility

In contrast to Portuguese Africa, large parts of what became British Africa was subjugated with support of imperial troops from outside Africa. Troops from the British West Indies played a key role in the occupation and consolidation of West Africa until most of their tasks were taken over by the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), established in 1901 (Killingray 1983, p. 442). In East Africa, the British Indian army was leading the occupation effort and played a major role during WWI (Moyse-Bartlett [1955] 2012, pp. 123–124). The deployment of Indian troops was expensive, however, and became increasingly unpopular in India. In 1916, the burden of the fighting was shifted partly to newly forged battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR), but the presence of Indian and South African troops remained crucial, including their assistance to poorly equipped Portuguese garrisons (Parsons 1999, p. 18; Newitt 1997, pp. 419–420).

Spreading army costs by promoting the mobility of troops constituted an integral part of British imperial governance in Africa. The WAFF was to secure four geographically separated colonies in West Africa: Gambia, Sierra

8 Colonia de Angola (1921-1929). *Orçamento Geral*. Luanda: Imprensa Nacional.

Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. In 1896, Chamberlain ordered the colonial office to consider "how far we can gradually organize a military police, real fighting men all through the West coast colonies – inter-changeable [...] being used in emergencies for any part of the coast" (cited in Killingray 1983, p. 442). Its first commander, Frederick Lugard, pleaded for a full integration and central coordination of the four divisions, including identical uniforms, similar arms, and equal contractual conditions (time of service, pay). Lugard reasoned that a unified force would guarantee concerted action against a foreign power (i.e. France). Hodgson, the Gold Coast governor, objected to the amalgamation of divisions, as it would withdraw powers from colonial governments who needed to respond to local demands for military intervention (Ukpabi 1987, pp. 65–67).

The KAR was formed in 1902 and incorporated the original forces of four protectorates: two Central Africa battalions, one East Africa battalion, two Uganda battalions, and one Somaliland battalion (Moyse-Bartlett [1955] 2012, pp. 129). Increasing investments in the training and organization of KAR soldiers under a unified command structure occurred during the final two years of WWI (Parsons 1999, p. 18, 20). In order to train African recruits, the British dispatched officers who had made a career elsewhere in Northern Africa (e.g. Egypt, Sudan), South Africa, Southern Asia or the Caribbean. The selection of martial races also followed earlier imperial experiences, and especially those of army formation under the British Raj after 1857 (Parsons 1999, p. 54). For instance, the regiments of the WAFF stationed in the Gold Coast were initially staffed by Yoruba and soldiers from the Hausa-Fulani tribes who were thought to possess exceptional martial skills (Ukpabi 1987, p. 88). In East Africa, semi-pastoral peoples such as the Nandi (Kalenjin) or Somali were wanted, partly also because of their vehement resistance against colonial encroachment (Parsons 1999, p. 54). The preference for specific ethnic groups was a widely adopted form of identity politics to improve coherence and commitment, building on sentiments of superiority of recruits versus local ethnicities.

Since the WAFF and the KAR retained a relatively small operational force during peace time, forced recruitment was the exception and voluntary service the rule. The rates of pay tended to be above the market rates for civilian jobs, and the army offered other material advantages in the form of uniforms, shoes, housing, food and training. Instead of paying chiefs to recruit soldiers, the relatively small armies in British Africa were in a position to select enlistees on medical grounds, fighting skills and height, with the exception of the World War periods, when sudden demand increases put pressure on the practice of voluntary service (Killingray 2010, p. 39). Because of this selectivity, and the stricter focus on military tasks rather than large scale recruitment of men for all sorts of labour, the troops received better training than the average recruit in the Portuguese colonial army. As the WAFF and the KAR gained

strength, the movement of troops *within* Africa became more important, as the liberation campaign of Ethiopia in 1940–1941 (Killingray 2010, p. 26), for instance, would show.

The colonial army of French West Africa evolved under a very different political discourse. While the British empire relied on the strength of the Indian army, the French envisioned a central role for the *Tiralleurs Sénégalais* (Echenberg 1991). During the 19th century the ranks of this colonial army were mostly filled with mercenary slaves, who were bought from their local masters via the so-called *rachat*. During the first decade of the 20th century, when the consolidation of control over French West Africa was largely completed, the pool of potential army recruits had grown dramatically, but it was the conscription law of 1912 that really extended the possibilities to further enlarge the army. The adoption of universal male military service allowed the French to call no less than 170,000 West Africans to arms during WWI. In 1919, shortly after the war, a more elaborate conscription code was adopted which stipulated the rules for conscription by lottery, regulated the time of service to a term of three years, and with assigned recruitment quotas to each *cercle* for selection among medically examined 20-year-old men. Mobile draft boards were erected in order to carry out the examinations and the lottery (Echenberg 1991, pp. 47–64).

With annual intake levies of c. 11,000 men, as well as fair numbers of volunteers and permanent soldiers, the army reached a peace-time size of c. 48,000 during the interwar years. Echenberg (1991, pp. 47–69) discusses how the recruitment process in theory deviated from its varied practices across FWA and explains why conscription was considered as a means of social mobility or escape from alternative forms of forced labour by some, but was rather unpopular with the great majority of African men. The rates of pay were low (c. 30CFA a month in the 1930s) compared to civilian jobs. Recruits were mobilized in army camps away from home and could also be sent abroad for long periods of time. Especially in areas where (migratory) wage labour was an alternative, serving in the army was a rather unattractive proposition.

Table 1 shows how the different ideas about the role of the colonial army translated into different troop sizes. In 1910 and 1930 the average per capita size of the Portuguese African army was about five times as large as the British African average. In 1930, the size of the army in Angola was double the size of the troops stationed in Nigeria, while Angola had barely three million inhabitants, and Nigeria about 24 million! Part of the size difference between Angola and Mozambique may be explained by the different administrative systems. For Mozambique, we lack data on the private mercenaries hired by, or forced to work for, the concession companies. If we were to add the number of men under arms servicing the companies – or alternatively, subtract the share of the indigenous population that paid their poll or hut taxes to the companies – the figures for Mozambique would certainly be closer to the levels observed in Angola.

TABLE 1 ▪ *Comparative size of permanent colonial armed forces in colonial Africa, 1910 and 1930*

	1910	1930	1910	1930
	Total size		Soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants	
Mozambique	4,600	3,500	1.1	0.8
Angola	11,000	6,740	4.1	2.2
PA average	**7,800**	**5,120**	**2.6**	**1.5**
Gold Coast	1,400	1,273	0.5	0.3
Sierra Leone	970	385	0.8	0.3
Nigeria	3,440	3,513	0.2	0.1
Gambia	126	152	0.7	0.7
Nyasaland	220	800	0.1	0.4
Uganda	800	720	0.2	0.2
Kenya	1,200	1,440	0.3	0.3
BA average	**1,165**	**1,183**	**0.4**	**0.3**
Belgian Congo	16,333	16,000	1.9	1.7
FWA permanent	11,890	13,000	1.0	0.9
FWA permanent + conscripts	11,890	48,000	1.0	3.3

Source: Comparative army size data from Killingray (1982, Appendix 1, p. 424–445); for FWA the estimates are from Echenberg (1991, p. 7 & 26), except for the 1913 size-estimate of the permanent force, which is from Killingray. Population data from Frankema and Jerven (2014).

In French West Africa, the size of the conscript army exceeded the forces enlisted in Portuguese Africa during the interwar years. Given not only the widespread use of forced labour, but also its detailed administrative organization, military service in French West Africa shared more in common with Portuguese Africa than it had with the development of the WAFF or the KAR in British Africa. However, as we will see in the coming sections, there were two critical differences that set French and Portuguese Africa apart. First, the costs of the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* were borne by French taxpayers, so that it was especially the extraction of numerous young men from the available labour force for a three-year period which compromised the other objectives of the colonial state-formation project: the *mise en valeur* was enforced without the fittest and potentially most able sub-stratum of the working-age population.[9]

9 This "security" subsidy has led some scholars to claim that French taxpayers bore the brunt of the empire (Marseille 1984; Lefeuvre 2006). Huillery (2014) has shown that the net transfers involved in military spending in French West Africa were only 0.24 percent of total

Second, the *Tirailleurs* fulfilled a completely different role in the wider scheme of both the French empire as well as the intra-European balance of power. Around 1930, the AOF had about ten times as many men under arms per 1,000 inhabitants than British West Africa. It also had a much larger proportion of Europeans in the colonial army (Ukpabi 1987, p. 89). While the British exploited the advantages of credible deterrence with access to an Indian army that dwarfed all other colonial armies and was responsible for the lion's share of imperial cross-subsidies, the French used their African forces in many other ways than just as a local peacekeeping corps: they supported French war efforts in Africa and fought on European soil during both WWI and WWII, something which the Colonial Office in London had been reluctant to consider (Killingray 1979, pp. 421–436).

The implicit subsidies that Indian tax-payers paid to secure the British empire were vast. Throughout the half century between 1880 and 1930 the share of military expenditure in total expenditure (i.e. federal state and the provinces combined) ranged between 25 and 35 percent.[10] These shares were comparable to Angola up to 1920 (see below), but even higher during the interwar years. If we convert the army expenses into £ per capita, the magnitude of the subsidy paid by India becomes even more impressive. In 1920 alone the expenses entailed about £55 million, on a total population of ca. 306 million. A cost of £0.18 per head was at least twice as much as the per capita costs in Portuguese Africa, while Indian GDP per head cannot have been much higher. The Indian subsidy to the British war effort and related debt position have fuelled a fierce academic debate since the 1960s on the "colonial drain" being responsible for persistent Indian poverty. Scholars who have argued against this interpretation have pointed out that military expenses were not necessarily without economic returns, partly in salaries spent domestically, but also in favoured lenders conditions and protection of Indian entrepreneurship and foreign investments, part of which were directed to Africa.[11]

To redress the imbalance, Winston Churchill, then Secretary of War and Air, wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in January 1920 that he was "strongly in favour of our beginning to employ African troops from West and East Africa, as well as from the Sudan, for imperial purposes outside the African continent" (cited in Killingray 1979, p. 428). The timing of his letter

French government revenue and points out that this "subsidy" facilitated the creation and protection of much larger resource flows in the opposite direction. Davis and Huttenback (1988) have argued, in a similar vein, that British taxpayers also paid for a significant part of the imperial security system by taking on the non-negligible bill of the British navy. This part of the external defence system especially benefitted the major settler colonies (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), but also reduced the costs of defence of British dependencies in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

10 Data from Roy (2019).

11 See for a summary of the debate Balachandran (2015).

was no coincidence. The government of British India increasingly resisted India's status as the lender of last resort in periods of geo-political crisis. The enormous supplies of Indian troops to the war efforts in 1914–1918, including services in East Africa, the Middle East and the trenches of Europe, had not only stretched the capacity of the Indian army to its limits, it had also eroded the soldiers' morale to fight for a cause that wasn't really theirs.

Churchill's proposal to merge the WAFF and the KAR under one command in order to expedite African forces inside and outside the continent was not new. The War Office in London had long been in favour of following the French example of dispatching African soldiers to overseas battle fields, including Europe. However, whereas the War Office saw the potential of an untapped source of military power, that could relieve some of the tensions between London and Delhi, the Colonial Office emphasised the problems this would raise. African soldiers, it was claimed, would lack discipline and morale, would be confronted with hostility in the Arab world and would be unacceptable as partners for British or Indian soldiers. Moreover, arming vast additional numbers of Africans would also raise the risk of internal revolts against colonial domination (Killingray 1979, pp. 423–424). By WWII, however, the expedition of African regiments to various hotbeds was no longer an issue. African regiments of the WAFF fought against the Italians in Ethiopia, and against the Japanese in Burma and East African troops were sent to Ceylon to release British garrisons (Killingray 2010, pp. 141–148). When India gained independence the focus shifted even further towards Africa as the mainstay of the British imperial army.

Finally, Table 1 shows that the size of the army in the Belgian Congo, which could not benefit from any outside options, was comparatively large as well. The Belgian Congolese government wielded a permanent army of c. 16,000 soldiers during the 1910s and 1920s, which was expanded during WWI, but reduced to c. 13,000 during the depression of the 1930s.[12] While the per capita size of the *Force Publique* in the Congo approached the figures for Portuguese Africa, a notable difference was that Portugal was deeply financially involved in the consolidation of its African empire, whereas the Belgian government kept the budgets of the metropole and the colony, including the costs of the Belgian and Congolese army, strictly separated. This policy was rooted in the time that King Leopold II ruled the Congo Free State as a private fiefdom (1885–1908), but continued after 1908 when the Belgian state was not prepared to take responsibility for its administrative needs and the Belgian constitution (modified in 1893) even forbade Belgian soldiers to serve in the Congo unless they went there as volunteers (Vanthemsche 2012, p. 55).

12 *Annuaire Statistique the Belgique*, Brussels, several issues 1910–1938.

5. Portugal's military expenditure in the lions' mirror

How did the difference in industrial and fiscal capacity translate into state expenditures on the military in Portugal, France and Britain? To answer this question we use the database composed by Sabaté (2016), which contains long-run annual time series of the share of military expenditure (Milex) in total (national) government expenditure. Figure 2 presents the series for Portugal, Britain and France for 1820–1940. The data show that the share of military expenditure of Portugal fell considerably behind that of France and the UK from the mid-19th century onwards, pivoting around 20 percent, whereas France spent around 30 percent and Britain around 35 percent. Major spikes occurred during the French-German war (1870–1871) and the Anglo-Boer war (1899–1902). All three countries saw a dramatic increase in their military expenditure during WWI. After the end of WWI, Portuguese military expenditure shares remained at a slightly higher level, but they did not rise so steeply in the run-up to WWII as in France and the UK.

FIGURE 2 ▪ *Share of military expenditure in total government expenditure of Portugal, France and Britain, 1820–1940 (in %)*



Source: Database compiled by Sabaté (2016).

Combining the insights of Figure 2 with the size estimates of GDP discussed above, implies that the military spending budgets of France and Britain dwarfed those of Portugal. In Table 2 we link the military expenditure data of Figure 2 with estimates of the total metropolitan and imperial populations. Average per capita military expenditures are presented for three periods: 1850–1884, 1885–1913, and 1914–1940. In order to generate a conserv-

ative estimate (i.e. biased against our central hypothesis), we included the population of all territories that were (yet) to be brought under control of the three metropoles. We also included the entire population of India (disregarding the distinction between British Raj and the Princely States) as well as the full population of many African colonies, which before 1885 were little more than coastal stepping stones. We excluded several small island states for which we lack adequate population estimates, as these would not change the comparison.[13] The per capita military expenditures are expressed in constant US$ of 1990, using GDP series from the Maddison Database Project.

TABLE 2 ▪ *Military expenditure in Portugal, France and the UK as % share of total government expenditure and GDP and in US$ per capita in metropole and empire, 1850–1940*

	Milex/Total govex	Milex/GDP	Milex p.c. metropole	Milex p.c. empire
	(in %)	(in %)	(in 1990 US$)	(in 1990 US$)
		1850–1884		
UK	35	2.7	81.0	7.4
France	29	3.2	62.9	29.7
Portugal	22	1.1	10.4	3.8
		1885–1913		
UK	41	3.2	137.1	13.9
France	29	3.3	90.9	38.9
Portugal	18	1.1	13.1	5.5
		1914–1940		
UK	29	11.4	637	63
France	36	11.5	384	145
Portugal	27	3.1	45	20

Source: Military expenditure from Sabaté (2016); population estimates and GDP in constant 1990 US$ from the Maddison Project Database, v. 2020.

Table 2 yields two important insights. First, also in per capita terms the military budgets available to Britain and France were much higher than those of Portugal. French and British taxpayers contributed considerably larger absolute amounts to the development and maintenance of military capacity, including naval power. As a percentage share of GDP, Portugal invested 1.1 percent in the metropolitan military (army plus navy), whereas in France and the

13 For Portuguese Africa, Guinea-Bissau is included, but São Tomé and Principe and Cape Verde are excluded.

UK these shares hovered around 2.7–3.3 percent. In per capita terms, the gap with France was in the order of 1:6–1:7, and the gap with the UK around 1:8–1:10. During the Interwar era (1914–1940) these gaps grew, in part because of the deeper involvement of Britain and France in WWI.

Second, even though the per capita contribution of French (metropolitan) taxpayers was lower than their British counterparts throughout 1850–1940, the amount made available per inhabitant in the empire (including the metropole) was two to three times larger. There are two reasons for this remarkable difference. The first reason is simple demographic weight: the British empire included ca. 440 million subjects by 1913, versus ca. 102 million in the French and just 13 million in the Portuguese empire. Larger populations allow for spreading costs. The second reason is the particular French policy of financing the colonial army directly from the French treasury, instead of relying on colonial fiscal revenues (as noted above, this doesn't say much about the use of underpaid human resources).

António Telo has argued that there was no other European metropole in the modern era that, in relative terms, spent so much on the consolidation of its empire as Portugal (Telo 1994, p. 156). At first sight, this claim seems hard to square with the figures shown above. After all, France and Britain did not just spend more on the projection of military power in per capita terms, they also devoted significantly higher shares of their already much larger GDP to their military. Is there any basis for Telo's claim?

To solve this conundrum we have to look at the comparative magnitude of direct fiscal transfers from the metropole to the colonies. Major investments in the navy do not entail a direct transfer of fiscal resources from Britain to any particular African or Asian territory, neither do troops stationed in Europe or India. Yet, since Portuguese colonial governments did not have such back-up options, Portugal transferred relatively large sums of money directly to its overseas territories. Portugal spent on average about 2.5 percent of its national state budget on transfers to the colonies between 1875 and 1914 and over 3.0 percent of its total tax revenues (see Appendix Figure A1). These shares are conservative estimates, since part of these transfers were covered by raising Portuguese state debt and remained invisible in the expenditure accounts. According to Huillery (2014), the French spent on average 0.24 percent of their annual national expenditure budget on the army in French West Africa between 1844 and 1957, and another 0.05 percent on development projects (Huillery 2014, p. 1). French transfers added less than 2 percent to locally raised revenues, whereas the transfers from Portugal to its colonies up to 1914 approached 20 percent per year on average (*Boletim Official de Moçambique* 1889). This is a non-negligible difference.

Although the data are fragmentary, it is possible to extend the comparison of transfers from Portugal with transfers made to several British African

colonies. As the Portuguese sources only stipulate total transfers without specifying their precise destination, we will assume here that almost all of the subsidies ended up in Angola or Mozambique. We will also assume that financial transfers were exclusively allocated to military and infrastructural projects, categories which are hard to disconnect because of the strategic importance of roads, railways and ports for army operations. Since Portugal was on the gold standard since 1854, nominal exchange rates of Escudos (*Milreis* prior to 1911) into British pounds were fairly stable up to 1913 (Valério 2001). For the years 1878–1913 we observe the annual transfers from Portugal for 15 years, estimating an average of c. £200,000.

For British Africa we focus on Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast. For these colonies (in part protectorates) we constructed time-series based on annually published Blue Books, covering the period 1850–1940, thus allowing comparisons in a similar timeframe. As in Angola and Mozambique, rudimentary colonial state structures were set up relatively early in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. All four areas were also involved in a long-run transition from slave trading to "legitimate" commerce, which affected the conditions for colonial government to develop revenue systems. Moreover, in all territories the extension of colonial rule involved major wars of "pacification", including heavy resistance against the extension of colonial taxes (e.g. four Anglo-Ashanti wars; the Hut Tax War).

We add up total transfers of grants-in-aid and the expenses on the military borne by the London treasury to compute metropolitan transfers. The data, which are presented in Appendix Table A1, show that the combined transfers to Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast pivoted around £90,000. Since these territories contained roughly half of the population of Portuguese Africa, this translated into virtually equal per capita transfers from Lisbon to Portuguese Africa (c. 0.025) as from London to this part of British West Africa (0.024). Telo was thus right in his observation that, especially *in relative terms*, the African colonies were a serious drain on the much smaller Portuguese treasury.

But there is more to Telo's argument. Appendix Figure A1 shows the contributions from Lisbon to its overseas dependencies for the full century between 1875 to 1975.[14] Contrary to Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, where all grants and military subsidies had ended by 1908, the transfers from Lisbon continued unabated. While the additional costs incurred during WWI were largely paid from local tax revenues and large-scale forced deployment of unremunerated army recruits, the metropolitan transfers spiralled out of control in the mid-1920s, when Republican investments in colonial — especially Angolan — infrastructure brought Portuguese state finances into dire

14 In relative terms, i.e. per capita, the smaller colonies such as Cape Verde, Sao Tomé, Macau and Timor may have benefitted more. See Ferreira and Pedra (1988, p. 92).

straits. Salazar's austerity measures (Smith 1974, pp. 653–667) introduced in the 1930s put an end to all overseas transfers, and this policy was only eased after WWII. The rising costs of the independence wars are visible from 1960 onwards.

The rules of engagement changed in 1914 with the granting of fiscal autonomy to the colonies. The ideal of fiscal autonomy was that investment capital in colonial development projects — railways in particular — were increasingly provided in the form of state loans instead of grants. Shares of debt servicing expenses in the colonial budget rose correspondingly. Ultimately, however, the Lisbon treasury remained the lender of last resort to its colonies, so that accumulating debt there continued to affect the creditworthiness of the Lisbon treasury. To maintain the colonial debt burden at manageable levels, the African population was squeezed into the fold of large-scale coerced labour schemes.

6. Military expenditure in Angola and Mozambique in African perspective

Let us now shift the lens to comparing the military expenses of the colonial governments of Angola and Mozambique with those of the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. From the analysis of the metropolitan transfers one might get the impression that the relatively large subsidies from Lisbon would have lowered the burden on local African taxpayers as well as European overseas settlers in Portuguese Africa. However, a comparison of local military expenses refutes this idea.

For Angola and Mozambique we collected data on central government spending on military, marine and police forces from the annual fiscal budgets (*orçamentos gerais*) and accounts (*contas de gerência*), which were published in a series of yearbooks (*Boletim Official*), newspapers and ministerial reports located at the national archives in Lisbon and Maputo. For the period 1850–1885 we retrieved data for several benchmark years, for the period 1885–1940 we were able to construct annual time-series. The concession companies that were active in Mozambique up to the 1930s had their own police forces, which are not covered in these state accounts (Moreno 1937, p. 10). We will discuss the implications of this omission as we proceed.

Figure 3a shows the share of total central government expenditure allocated to the colonial security forces of Angola and Mozambique (including minor marine expenses) and compares these to the series for Portugal (cf. Figure 2) (Sabaté 2016, pp. 275–298). Figure 3b presents real per capita expenses on security forces expressed in Escudos of 1914 (constant prices). Metropolitan expenses on police forces in Portugal are excluded, but expenditures

on police forces in the colonies are included as the distinction in roles and mandates between the police and the military were not that sharp. We refer to the combined category as "security forces".

Before 1914, the colonial governments of Mozambique and Angola reserved a considerably higher proportion of their budgets for security expenses than the metropole. During the 1850s to 1870s more than half of both colonial budgets was spent on the military. These expenses declined to c. 30–40 percent in the 1890s and rose again as colonial armies expanded and Portuguese attempts to extend control over vast hinterlands intensified. As colonial government budgets expanded, the security spending shares in Mozambique fell from about 50 percent in 1905 to around 20 percent in 1920, which is consistent with the fact that most areas in Mozambique were by then brought under control, and also with the fact that security efforts were partly outsourced to private concession companies operating in the central and northern zones of the country – which are not covered by our data.[15]

In Angola, the colonial state remained engaged in "pacification" wars up to 1920, fighting against relatively well-organized coalitions of African polities. The most prominent example is the war against the *Dembo*, who lived northeast of Luanda and were the last Mbundu tribe to be defeated by the Portuguese. In the official records the Dembo-Portuguese war lasted three years, from 1907 to 1910, and involved considerable numbers of casualties on both sides. In reality, however, the Dembo were only subdued in 1920 (Magno 1934, pp. 37–106). The steep rise in military spending during WWI was largely related to these internal wars, while British colonial forces assisted in the defence of Angola's external borders against German invasions from the south. Local African taxpayers thus saw a large part of their public funds devoted to their own subjugation.[16]

With the establishment of effective military control, the per capita budget reserved for security forces became smaller in Angola than in Mozambique. By the mid-1920s, security expenditures had come down to about 10–20 percent of the central government budget. The decline in the 1920s and 1930s aligned with reductions in real per capita military spending. There are two explanations for this reversal. First, the colonial state in Mozambique took over security tasks in the 1930s that were previously carried out by private conces-

15 In 1917, for example, the "Barue revolt" broke out in the central district of Manica. Several ethnic groups united and attacked Portuguese colonial forces across the Zambezi valley. The uprising was mainly led by the Makombe, one of the most prominent traditional ruling families in the region. The main driver of the uprising was the intensive labour conscription connected to war-time mobilization. The clashes continued up to 1920. See Pélissier (2006) and Galli (2003, pp. 59-63).

16 Pélissier (1987) has counted 121 military campaigns in Mozambique between 1854 and 1918 and discusses their causes, varying from tax collection to the suppression of "banditry" and "looting".

FIGURE 3A ▪ *Share of spending on security forces in total colonial government expenditure in Angola, Mozambique and Portugal, 1850–1940 (in %)*



Source: Annual series of the *Boletim Official*, General Budgets and Statistical Yearbooks of Mozambique and Angola between 1850 and 1940; series for Portugal from Sabaté (2016).

FIGURE 3B ▪ *Real per capita expenditure on security forces in Angola and Mozambique, 1850–1940 (in 1914 Escudos)*



Source: Expenditure data see Figure 3a. Price index from Bastien (2001, pp. 642–645).

Note: For the years 1918–1927 we made a downward adjustment to this price index because of the delayed transmission of metropolitan inflation into colonial price levels and, especially, military wages. Without this adjustment the purchasing power of the colonial central budget would be greatly underestimated; population from Frankema and Jerven (2014).

sion companies. This demanded additional resources, the more so because the army had to spread attention and resources over three relatively unintegrated areas (Alexopoulou and Juif 2017). Secondly, Angola did not just enjoy greater administrative homogeneity, but its army also benefitted from a more ex-

tensive railway network. After WWI it could maintain a larger army of African soldiers at lower costs.

To put the evolution of the fiscal-military nexus in perspective it is instructive to look at the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone again. Figures 4a and 4b present: 1) metropolitan expenses on local security as a share of total colonial state expenditures; 2) local expenses on security as a share of colonial state expenditures; 3) British grants-in-aid as a share of total colonial state revenues; and 4) colonial custom revenues as a share of total colonial state revenues. We have already seen that in British West Africa, fiscal autonomy was achieved earlier than in Angola or Mozambique, but Figures 4a and 4b add another point to the comparison. The British colonies were granted much more time to establish a fiscal-military apparatus before the cost of it were hived-off to local budgets.

London covered most of the military expenses to secure order and guarantee conditions for commercial expansion.[17] These initial "start-up-aids" were high compared to the locally available government budgets. Grants-in-aid were maintained for some five decades and only declined when local custom revenues gained substance (Gardner 2012; Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014). When direct metropolitan subsidies were abolished around 1870 in the Gold Coast and 1895 in Sierra Leone, metropolitan expenses on the colonial armies still remained in place. The Gold Coast government started to invest in its army on a structural basis after the 3rd Anglo-Ashanti war (1873–1874), and diverted a major part of the 4th Anglo-Ashanti war (1895–1896) to the local budget. In Sierra Leone, local investments in the military began in 1890, but most of the costs incurred during the Hut Tax War (1896–1898) were still diverted to British taxpayers.

To be sure, the rise in custom revenues gave the colonial governments of the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone a considerable advantage in financing the colonial state building project (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014, pp. 371–400). In French West Africa, despite the fact that all military expenses were borne by the Paris treasury, the reliance on forced labour to finance the colonial state building project was much more prominent (Echenberg 1991; Keese 2014; van Waijenburg 2018). In Portuguese Africa, however, the burden of colonial state formation consisted of three layers: a much larger slice of locally raised taxes went straight into the military, there was heavy reliance on large-scale forced labour, and Portuguese transfers, with interruptions, continued to play a key role throughout the colonial era to make ends meet (Allina 2012; Bandeira Jerónimo 2015).

17 Formally, the colony of Sierra Leone was established in 1808 as A British Crown colony. The Gold Coast colony was established in 1821 as part of British West Africa. Blue Books were published in Sierra Leone from 1824 onwards, and in the Gold Coast from 1846 onwards.

FIGURE 4A ▪ *Share of military expenditure, metropolitan subsidies and custom revenue in total revenue and expenditure, Gold Coast 1846–1939 (in %)*



Sources: Blue Books of the Gold Coast, 1846–1939, obtained from British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. *African Blue Books.*

FIGURE 4B ▪ *Share of military expenditure, metropolitan subsidies and custom revenue in total revenue and expenditure, Sierra Leone, 1830–1939 (in %)*



Sources: Blue Books of Sierra Leone, 1830–1939, obtained from British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. *African Blue Books.*

Tables 3 and 4 show that military expenditures by Portuguese African governments were much larger than by British African governments in relative and absolute terms. Whereas military expenses in Portuguese Africa consumed

more than half of the colonial state budget in the mid-19th century, and still a full one-third in 1913, in British Africa expenses ranged between c. 3–10 percent. The gradual decline of security expenditure shares in Portuguese Africa led to some convergence, but also in the interwar years the differences remained substantial. Relatively high shares of spending recorded in the Gold Coast in 1888 and Sierra Leone in 1898 were either caused by warfare – i.e. the hut tax war of 1896–1898 in Sierra Leone – or the delayed payment of a war bill in an area with prolonged conflict. As we saw above, these gaps cannot be explained away by British subsidies. Even though London occasionally took the bill of military operations in the early stages of colonial state formation, and even though part of the costs incurred in wars of conquest were converted into colonial state debt and re-paid by indigenous tax-payers in the form of amortization and interest, absolute expenses on the army in Portuguese Africa were much higher.

To compare absolute expenses per head of the population, we took the population series from Frankema and Jerven (2014) and converted Escudos into current British Pounds using official exchange rates.[18] Up to 1918 these exchange rates were fairly stable and unlikely to bias the comparison. Rampant inflation during 1918–1925 somewhat distorts the comparison, but the overall picture is clear: in Portuguese Africa, the absolute per capita amount of money spent on the army was at least double the amount recorded in British West and East African colonies, and up to 1920 it was much more than that.

In this regard, Portuguese African taxpayers shared much in common with their neighbours in in the Belgian Congo, who bore the full brunt of the colonial military apparatus. During the early 1920s, the expenses on the *Force Publique* comprised about 20 percent of the total budget. This share dropped to c. 10 percent in the early 1930s. Using official exchange rates, we estimate the per capita expenses in 1930 at £0.055, which is comparable to the rates we find for Portuguese Africa and more than double the expenses recorded anywhere in British Africa.[19]

There is one more caveat to this comparison. In British Africa, police forces took, on average, about 5 to 8 percent from the state budget in the 1920s and 1930s. In Portuguese Africa the shares of the *polícia civil*, which were reported as a separate expenditure category from the 1900s, ranged from 2 to 4 percent (Da Silveira 1938, p. 534). If we were to combine the expenditures

18 Although these population figures are based on extrapolated census estimates from the 1950s, they are to be preferred over contemporary census reports. Colonial censuses systematically underestimated African populations amongst others due to a lack of administrative capacity and deliberate underreporting by indigenous rulers. Undercounting was likely more severe in areas that remained outside colonial control. Frankema and Jerven (2014, pp. 912-913).

19 In 1930 the Belgian Franc was tied to the British Pound at a rate of 35 to 1.

on military and police forces, the gap in per capita expenditure would be smaller, but far from closed. In 1912–1913, spending on police forces comprised 3.8 percent of the total budget of Mozambique, in 1925–1926 it was 2.5 percent, and in 1934-1935 again 3.8 percent.[20] In Angola, spending on public security (*seguranca pública*) ranged from 1.5 to 2.6 percent during the period 1929–1938.[21] Limited expenditure on police forces reveals the reliance on the army in securing domestic order. Most of the police officers (*cabos* and *cipais*) were recruited from indigenous communities at lower salaries than those commanded by either European or African military officials. Moreover, in the zones where concession-owning companies ruled, policing as well as tax collection was executed by company employees, so that police expenses remained outside the accounts of the central administration.

TABLE 3 ▪ *Shares of colonial public spending on military and marine forces, 1865–1939 (in %)*

	1865	1876	1888	1898	1906	1913	1920	1925	1930	1934	1939
Mozambique	51.6	42.9	35	33.5	40.5	30	21.2	17.8	19.8	15.1	11.3
Angola	54.2	49.9	39.5	43.1	52.3	36	34	15	10.7	11.2	7.8
PA average	**52.9**	**46.4**	**37.3**	**38.3**	**46.4**	**33**	**27.6**	**11.7**	**12**	**13.2**	**9.6**
Gold Coast	0	10	21.4	9.6	13.8	6.1	8.6	3.1	4.2	4.4	4.7
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	26.3*	8.2	6.1	5.3	4.9	5.9	6.3	6.2
Nigeria	10.7	12.9	11.8	7.3	8.4	12.3	10	7.3	5.7	7.6	5.4
Gambia	0	0	0	0	10.7	9.1	8.5	4	4.3	5.2	3.8
Uganda					0*	17	17.2	6.7	4.8	3.5	3.6
Kenya					0*	8	10	5.4	3.9	4	5.4
Tanzania								7.4			5.9
BA average	**2.7**	**5.7**	**8.3**	**5.6**	**10.3**	**9.8**	**9.9**	**5.5**	**4.8**	**5.2**	**5**

Source: For the Portuguese colonies see Figure 3b; for the British colonies, annual series of colony-specific Blue Books as used in Frankema (2011, Appendix Table 1, pp. 147–148). * The exceptionally high figure for Sierra Leone in 1898 relates to the Hut Tax War. We excluded this observation from the calculated British African average for this particular year.

20 Data for Mozambique 1912–1928 from *Orçamentos da Receita e Tabelas da Despesa Ordinaria e Extraordinaria da Provincia de Moçambique*, Imprensa Nacional, Lourenco Marques. For 1929–1940 data from Colonia de Moçambique, *Relatorios da Direccao dos Servicos de Fazenda*, Imprensa Nacional, Lourenco Marques.

21 Data for Angola, 1929–1940 from Colonia de Angola, *Orçamentos Gerais da Receita e Despesa*, Imprensa Nacional, Luanda.

TABLE 4 ▪ *Public spending on military forces per capita (in current British pounds)*

	1898	1906	1913	1920	1925	1930	1935	1939
Mozambique	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.06
Angola	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.12	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
PA average	**0.04**	**0.08**	**0.08**	**0.07**	**0.03**	**0.06**	**0.05**	**0.06**
Gold Coast	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
Sierra Leone	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
Nigeria	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gambia	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
Uganda		0.00	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
Kenya		0.00	0.02		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
BA average	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.02**	**0.03**	**0.03**	**0.03**	**0.02**	**0.03**

Sources: For the expenditure data see Figure 3b; population estimates from Frankema and Jerven (2014), online database available at https://www.aehnetwork.org/data-research/; Escudo-GBP exchange rates from Fontoura and Valério (2001, p. 745).

TABLE 5 ▪ *Expenditure on health and education as a share of total government expenditure in Portuguese and British Africa, 1920–1940 (in %)*

	c. 1920			c. 1930			c. 1940		
	Education	**Health**	**Total**	**Education**	**Health**	**Total**	**Education**	**Health**	**Total**
Mozambique	1.3	8.9	10.2	1.1	6	7.1	2.5	6.5	8.9
Angola				2.1	5.6	7.7	3.9	8.8	12.7
PA Average				**1.6**	**5.8**	**7.4**	**3.2**	**7.7**	**10.8**
Gold Coast	4.2	9.2	13.4	6.8	11.2	18	7.4	13	20.4
Sierra Leone	2.7	8.3	11	7.4	13.1	20.5	7.4	9.4	16.8
Nigeria	1.5	4.5	6	3.7	7.6	11.3	5.1	8.1	13.2
Gambia	2.3	10	12.3	2.9	12.7	15.6	3	15.1	18.1
Nyasaland	0.5	9.1	9.6	4.2	10.7	14.9	3.3	8.2	11.5
Uganda	0.6	10.2	10.8	4.1	11.6	15.7	6.3	11.2	17.5
Kenya				6.4	8.3	14.7	6.1	7.1	13.2
BA Average	**2.0**	**8.6**	**10.5**	**5.1**	**10.7**	**15.8**	**5.5**	**10.3**	**15.8**

Sources: Data for Mozambique 1912–1928 from *Orçamentos da Receita e Tabelas da Despesa Ordinaria e Extraordinaria da Provincia de Moçambique*, Imprensa Nacional, Lourenco Marques. For 1929–1940 data from Colonia de Moçambique, *Relatorios da Direccao dos Servicos de Fazenda*, Imprensa Nacional, Lourenco Marques. Data for Angola, 1929–1940, from Colonia de Angola, Orçamentos Gerais da Receita e Despesa, Imprensa Nacional, Luanda. For British Africa we used the time-series underpinning Appendix Table 1 in Frankema (2011). Data available upon request.

Finally, it is worth asking whether the higher military expenses in Portuguese Africa corresponded with lower budgets for welfare services, and in particular health and education. Table 5 presents estimates of welfare spending gathered from annual fiscal accounts. The data suggest that welfare expenditure received lower priority in Portuguese Africa and that the gap in welfare spending increased, especially in the 1920s. In the interpretation of these data, it is also important to note that British colonial states in East Africa existed for a shorter time than in British West Africa, but caught up in terms of fiscal capacity during the 1920s and surpassed Angola and Mozambique in welfare spending, despite the much longer military and fiscal presence of the Portuguese in these areas (Frankema 2011, Appendix Table A.1., pp. 147–148).

7. Conclusion

We have explored the thesis that weaker metropoles had to invest relatively heavily in the militarization of their colonies to secure colonial violence monopolies and sustain their territorial claims against stronger imperial powers. We have argued that Angola and Mozambique could not benefit from the economies of scale, the imperial cross-subsidies and the credible deterrence inherent to a global empire governed by a lion power. We have shown that military expenses extracted significantly larger parts of the colonial state budget in Portuguese Africa, and that this may have eroded the means to invest in welfare services. We have shown that the size of the armies in Portuguese Africa were comparatively large and that recruitment policies relied heavily on coercion instead of voluntary service. Tentative evidence suggests that the Belgian Congo, another jackal, shared similar features. Although we do not pretend that this study has offered evidence for a generalizable law of colonial state formation that links metropolitan identity to fiscal-military state development, we do believe that the data provides sufficient evidence to call for more comparative research on this important topic.

This paper has focussed on the implications of differences in geo-political power for the militarization and fiscal development of the colonial state. However, there are more effects that will require attention in future research. One of these is the intricate connection between the organisation of colonial armies and forced labour programs. In contrast to the more professional army recruitment practices in British Africa, which tended to be selective and based on monetary compensation, the governments in Angola and Mozambique worked with a system where private companies and local chiefs were key intermediaries, and contractual conditions were prone to remain a dead letter.

The imperialism of jackals and lions thus translated into tangible differences in social orders, in which it is hard to separate metropolitan *visions* or

ideologies of imperial governance from the *capacity* to implement such visions in practice. The counterfactual question to scholars praising the "benign" features of British rule in Africa as being fundamentally different from the oppressive features of Portuguese colonialism, is what would be left of these principles, if Portugal would have ruled the waves, and Britain would have preyed on the lion's leftovers?

The jackal-lion metaphor also has its limitations though. Unlike the British, the Portuguese, Belgians and the French relied to a large extent on the implicit tax revenues derived from forced labour.[22] Unlike the British, who pressed for reforms of colonial labour policies, all three metropoles were reluctant to give up their forced labour programs when the ILO started to raise their calls for abolishment in the 1920s (van Waijenburg 2018, pp. 49–50). One of the ways to circumvent the ILO Forced Labour Convention of 1930 was to extend a longstanding practice of using army recruits for work on colonial infrastructural projects (Ross 1925). The "official" statistics of the Portuguese colonies record a dramatic rise in the number of military servants in Angola, with a total registered number of soldiers aged 18 to 30 exceeding 100,000 by the mid-1930s (*Anuário Estatístico de Angola 1934–5*, p. 299). Military recruitment thus became used as a "cover-up" for the prolongation of forced labour, and the maintenance of an important, albeit implicit, source of non-monetary taxation derived from this shadow work force.

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22 In the 1930s France, Belgium and Portugal formed an "interimperial entente" criticising the ILO's African focus and arguing for the invocation of the colonial clause (Jerónimo and Monteiro 2013, p. 148).

Author contribution statement

Kleoniki Alexopoulou: framework, investigation, dataset, formal analysis, writing, visualization. Ewout Frankema: framework, methodology, dataset, formal analysis, writing, supervision.

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Appendix

TABLE A1 ▪ *Metropolitan transfers to Portuguese and parts of British West Africa, 1875–1913*

	Transfers to Portuguese Africa		Transfers to British West Africa (Gold Coast & Sierra Leone)	
	£	£ per capita	£	£ per capita
1875			57,672	0.018
1876			50,887	0.016
1877			57,079	0.018
1878	231,111	0.030	52,478	0.016
1879	182,222	0.023	50,584	0.016
1880	215,556	0.028	52,280	0.016
1881	95,556	0.012	57,380	0.018
1882	115,556	0.015	52,004	0.016
1883	126,667	0.016	44,384	0.013
1884	157,778	0.020		
1885	300,000	0.038	63,702	0.019
1886	335,556	0.042	72,530	0.021
1887	391,111	0.049	73,319	0.021
1888			47,432	0.014
1889			29,174	0.008
1890			82,691	0.024
1891			66,231	0.019
1892			75,173	0.021
1893	187,500	0.024	50,320	0.014
1894	191,379	0.024	59,323	0.016
1895			60,382	0.016
1896			64,421	0.017
1897			80,008	0.022
1898			222,642	0.059
1899			284,406	0.075
1900			367,022	0.096
1901			279,054	0.073
1902			152,524	0.039
1903			173,493	0.044
1904	70,370	0.009	202,452	0.051
1905	93,750	0.013	158,651	0.040
1906			149,606	0.037

1907			138,601	0.034
1908			0	0.000
1909			0	0.000
1910			0	0.000
1911			0	0.000
1912			0	0.000
1913	269,231	0.038	0	0.000
Average	**197,556**	**0.025**	**90,208**	**0.024**

Sources: Data for Portuguese Africa for 1875–1912 from various issues of *Boletim Official do Governo Geral da Provincia de Moçambique*; data for 1913–1974 from Ferreira and Pedra (1988, pp. 98-101); for British West Africa from the Blue Books of the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone (various issues 1875–1914). See British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, African Blue Books; population estimates from Frankema and Jerven (2014).

FIGURE A1 ▪ *Share of metropolitan transfers to the colonies in Portuguese central government expenditure, 1875–1974 (in %)*



Source: See Appendix Table A1.

■

Imperialisme de xacals i lleons. L'estat fiscal i militar a l'Àfrica portuguesa en el mirall de l'Àfrica britànica i francesa, c. 1850-1940

Resum

Adoptem la metàfora del xacal i el lleó per explorar si la variació en el poder geopolític de les metròpolis va afectar la creació de capacitat fiscal i militar a l'Àfrica colonial. Centrant-nos en l'Àfrica portuguesa, partim de la hipòtesi que els contribuents autòctons d'Angola i Moçambic es van veure obligats a invertir més en ordre, seguretat i el seu propi sotmetiment, ja que Portugal no tenia la riquesa, les economies d'escala, les subvencions creuades imperials i els mitjans de dissuasió creïbles que sustentaven les polítiques de seguretat imperials britàniques i franceses. Demostrem que les despeses en forces militars i policials van representar una proporció més elevada del pressupost colonial a l'Àfrica portuguesa. L'exèrcit portuguès africà també era relativament gran, depenia en gran mesura del reclutament de mà d'obra forçada i va mantenir un equipament deficient. Mentre que la Gran Bretanya i França van donar suport als seus exèrcits colonials africans amb importants subvencions de la metròpoli i imperials (i, de fet, la Gran Bretanya va mantenir moltes menys tropes en sòl africà), les condicions de l'«imperialisme xacal» van suposar una càrrega més gran per a les finances estatals colonials a llarg termini.

Paraules clau: govern colonial, imperialisme, Àfrica, història militar, finances públiques, formació de l'estat.

Codis JEL: N17, N47, H20, F50, F54.

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Imperialismo de chacales y leones. El Estado fiscal-militar en el África portuguesa en el espejo del África británica y francesa, c. 1850-1940

Resumen

Adoptamos las metáforas del chacal y el león para explorar si la variación en el poder geopolítico de las metrópolis afectó a la creación de capacidad fiscal y militar en el África colonial. Centrándonos en el África portuguesa, partimos de la hipótesis de que los contribuyentes autóctonos de Angola y Mozambique se vieron obligados a invertir más en orden, seguridad y su propio sometimiento, ya que Portugal carecía de la riqueza, las economías de escala, las subvenciones cruzadas imperiales y los medios de disuasión creíbles que sustentaban las políticas de seguridad imperiales británicas y francesas. Demostramos que los gastos en fuerzas militares y policiales extrajeron las mayores proporciones del presupuesto colonial en el África portuguesa. El Ejército portugués africano también era relativamente grande, dependía en gran medida del reclutamiento de mano de obra forzada y mantuvo un equipamiento deficiente. Mientras que Gran Bretaña y Francia apoyaron a los ejércitos coloniales africanos con importantes subvenciones metropolitanas e imperiales (y, de hecho, Gran Bretaña mantuvo muchas menos tropas en suelo africano), las condiciones del «imperialismo chacal» supusieron una mayor carga para las finanzas estatales coloniales a largo plazo.

Palabras clave: gobierno colonial, imperialismo, África, historia militar, finanzas públicas, formación del estado.

Códigos JEL: N17, N47, H20, F50, F54.