

ON ONE OF THOMAS DE VIO CAJETAN'S DOCTRINAL SOURCES: SECULAR ARISTOTELIANISM IN PADUA**Ceferino P.D. Muñoz**

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Resumen

Durante mucho tiempo se creyó que Cayetano era un tomista casi en estado puro cuya única y principal influencia teórica era la Tomás de Aquino. Sobre este mismo supuesto, también tendió a pensarse que Cayetano junto a su maestro y a otros pensadores conformaban un bloque doctrinal uniforme conocido como aristotelismo-tomista. Sin embargo, muchas de las tesis del comentador de Gaeta contienen supuestos teóricos muy distintos y hasta opuestos a los del Aquinate. Aquí nos centraremos en uno de esos supuestos que operan potentemente en la *forma mentis* de Cayetano, a saber: el aristotelismo secular de Padua.

Palabras clave: Cayetano, aristotelismo secular, tomismo, fe, razón**Abstract**

Cajetan was long believed to be an almost pure Thomist whose one and only theoretical influence came from Aquinas. On this basis, Cajetan along with his mentor and other thinkers were also thought to form a uniform doctrinal school known as Aristotelian-Thomism. However, many of the theses of Gaetanus's commentator contain theoretical assumptions that are very different and even opposed to those of Aquinas. Here we will focus on one of those assumptions that operate potentially on Cajetan's *forma mentis*, namely the secular Aristotelianism of Padua.

Key Words: Cajetan, secular Aristotelianism, Thomism, faith, reason

Some Remarks About Cajetan

Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1468-1534) is known mainly for two reasons: one historical and the other doctrinal. The former refers to the fact that Cardinal Cajetan was appointed as Pope Leo X's legate in Germany between 1518 and 1519 in an attempt to deal with the crisis caused by Luther's new doctrines (WICKS 1977: 9-32). Our author interviewed Friar Martin three times, but these meetings were not enough for the Augustinian to retract his views. Nevertheless, according to John Todd, for Luther, Cajetan must have been "the most intelligent and educated man in Rome" (TODD 1964: 153).

The second reason why Cajetan gained fame, even in life, is because he was the classic commentator of Thomas Aquinas. For centuries our author was considered an "alter Thomas." Thomistic scholars used to say: "Aquinatis quasi vivens" [...] "si vis Thomam intelligere, lege Cajetanum" (LÁZARO 2015: 1). The praise can be perfectly understood in view of the great task of restoring the work of Aquinas that the Cardinal carried out. For example, he succeeded in having the *Summa Theologiae* replace the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as a basic work both for teaching students and for contemplation and research in the case of professional theologians. Likewise, the number of his writings is amazing (many of them explaining and defending his master Thomas), despite his being absorbed in important government responsibilities since his forties. According to Bandera González, some researchers have been able to point out up to one hundred and fourteen titles, not all of them published (BANDERA GONZÁLEZ 1885: 674). However, the Dominican Yves M.-J. Congar, in a special issue of the *Revue Thomiste* devoted to Cajetan, mentioned a total of one hundred and forty-eight titles, leaving aside letters, administrative documents, and speeches.¹

In view of the above, it may be strange and even difficult to prove that Cajetan received, incorporated, and then developed intellectual influences from schools of thought that opposed the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas and even denied some of his fundamental theses. However, that is what some recent studies show (DE TANOÛARN 2009).²

In other words, on the basis of Cajetan's vast contributions to Thomism, an interpretative apriorism has developed that is still latent when addressing some of the Cardinal's numerous and profound texts. This exegetical presupposition is as follows: this Thomistic commentator is usually read as part of a doctrinal whole, and that whole is the thought of St. Thomas and that of several later Thomists, among whom we find Cajetan himself, John of St. Thomas, and many others. In this sense, to say that Cajetan was influenced by secular Aristotelianism could seem in disagreement with the traditional readings that have been made of his work (MUÑOZ 2014: 950-952).

¹ For a complete overview of Cajetan's work, cfr. CONGAR 1934-1935: 36-49.

² A complete survey of other works in line with this one can be found in MUÑOZ, 2014: 950-952.

However, the aforementioned apriorism stems from the fact that the importance of the historical-doctrinal context in which our author lived, which in one way or another surely shaped his subsequent theoretical reflections, has not been given sufficient attention. As Hyancinthe Laurent rightly pointed out in his introduction to Cajetan's Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*:

[...] si se quiere percibir su profunda originalidad [la de Cayetano], es necesario no considerar a ésta en sí misma, desvinculada de su entorno. Puesto que el mismo es esencial para introducirse en este siglo [XVI], en cuya presencia se desarrolló dicha originalidad [...] Una primera investigación se impone: es necesario examinar brevemente los sistemas filosóficos que Cayetano pudo conocer y que, sea por su doctrina, o por su método, pudieron tener una influencia en la elaboración de su trabajo (CAYETANO 1938: 8-9).³

Following this interpretive line, here we intend to focus on one of those philosophical systems that noticeably marked the course of Cajetanian thought, namely, Paduan secular Aristotelianism. For methodological and extension reasons, we cannot delve too deeply into other variants of Paduan Aristotelism (FORLIVESI 2004: 174),⁴ such as Scotian Aristotelism⁵ —although we will briefly refer to it later— which also had a strong presence at the University of Padua and which, as we understand it, also exerted an important influence on Thomas de Vio Cajetan.

Secular Aristotelianism

The current of thought that makes a reading of Aristotle detached from theological aspects and that, in general lines, promulgates a completely naturalistic Aristotelianism (FERRATER MORA 1964: 359-360) has been given the name of secular Aristotelianism (KRISTELLER 1985: 101).⁶

In spite of initial resistance, Aristotle's texts, together with Averroes's commentaries —whose dissemination began in the twelfth century—were firmly established at the University of Paris⁷ and other Nordic universities by the mid-thirteenth century, albeit with different ramifications. From the fourteenth century onwards, the teaching of philosophy was increasingly separated

³ [...] if one wishes to perceive his [Cajetan's] profound originality it is necessary not to consider it in itself, detached from its context, for this is essential in order to delve into this century [the sixteenth century], when this originality developed [...] A first inquiry is necessary: one should briefly consider the philosophical systems which Cajetan might have known and which, either doctrinally or methodologically, might have had an influence on the production of his work [...].

⁴ According to Forlivesi: "Tra questi, nei secoli dal XV al XVII, i rappresentanti delle varie forme di aristotelismo vive all'Università di Padova: Trombetta, de Vio, Vernia, Pomponazzi, Achillini, Zimara, Nifo, Malafossa, Piccolomini, Zabarella, Fabri, Fræe, Liceti, Piccinardi, Arnou e molti altri".

⁵ PINI, 1995: 375-389.

⁶ Although Kristeller favours the expression 'Italian secular Aristotelianism' over 'Paduan Aristotelianism', authors such as Saranyana (2011: 429) use the latter. In fact, it seems more comprehensive, as it includes secular Aristotelianism as well as the aforementioned Scotian Aristotelianism and other branches of Aristotelianism.

⁷ "El averroísmo parisiense es uno de los hechos menos conocidos en la historia de la filosofía y esto ha hecho que su estudio haya carecido de atractivo hasta hace relativamente poco tiempo" (MARTÍNEZ BARRERA, 2015: 48). ["Parisian averroism is one of the least known facts in the history of philosophy and this has rendered its study unattractive until relatively recently"].

from theology in European university circles. It is true that philosophers tended to recognize the superiority of the latter, but they were also increasingly asserting the independence of philosophy; such was the position of Siger of Brabant (DI GIACOMO 2013: 65-90. FALGUERAS 1992: 133-152) and Boetius of Dacia,⁸ to mention but two of the most renowned thinkers (GILSON 2007: 529-566).

Were we to summarize the thought of these two masters, and in general that of the so-called 'rigid Aristotelians'⁹—at the risk of oversimplifying—we could say that for them philosophy *stricto sensu* was exclusively reduced to Aristotelian writings. Thus, for such philosophers, the thought of the Stagirite had to be taken as it was, without any alteration, without commentaries, criticisms or updates that adapted it to new problems; that is, they assimilated it in a dogmatized way. Moreover, for this line of philosophers it is of no great importance whether or not this form of thought is in agreement with faith.

The twofold effect of the entry of the texts of the Lyceum master into medieval universities is remarkable. On the one hand, it brought about a pronounced vindication of the value of sensitive data as a means towards intelligible knowledge. In this way Aristotle provided Christianity with a philosophical justification in keeping with its principles, which highlighted the dignity of created things. On the other hand, a few years later, a different reading of the Stagirite separated from the theological sphere would produce a notable rupture between faith and reason. In relation to this point S. Filippi argues:

The introduction of the Aristotelian corpus to the Christian context between the twelfth and the thirteenth century had favoured the conception of a material reality that was metaphysically consistent and the idea that human faculties of knowledge could reach the intelligible core of reality on the basis of sensitive data. However, the decline of this view was also related to Aristotelianism: this time, to the one fostered by Latin Averroists. Indeed, these medieval masters took the study of Aristotle to such a level of enthusiasm that they wished to keep it in a 'pure state', uncontaminated by the motives of Christian theology. But this Aristotle read with Averroistic eyes led to statements that were simply contrary to the faith, because he was attributed having demonstrated with rational necessity theses that were unacceptable within the framework of [divine] revelation.¹⁰

⁸ On some significant points and texts of the thought of Boetius of Dacia, see: MARTÍNEZ BARRERA 2008: 197-207.

⁹ Cfr. VAN STEENBERGHEM, 1970.

¹⁰ Quotation marks by the author. "La introducción del corpus aristotélico en el ámbito cristiano entre los siglos XII y XIII había favorecido la concepción de una realidad material metafísicamente consistente y de unas facultades humanas de conocimiento que podían llegar a la médula inteligible de lo real a partir del dato sensible. Sin embargo, también la caída de esta visión tuvo relación con el aristotelismo: esta vez, con aquel propiciado por los averroístas latinos. En efecto, estos maestros medievales llevaron el estudio de Aristóteles a tal nivel de entusiasmo que desearon mantenerlo en «estado puro», incontaminado con los motivos de la teología cristiana. Pero ese Aristóteles leído con ojos averroístas conducía a afirmaciones lisa y llanamente contrarias a la fe, pues se le atribuía el haber demostrado con necesidad racional tesis inaceptables en el marco de la Revelación" (FILIPPI 2010: 41-42).

Italian Renaissance Aristotelians inherited this stance from their predecessors. This type of Aristotelianism is usually known as ‘Averroist’,¹¹ as it maintained some of the theses of The Commentator. Among these was the idea of the methodological autonomy of philosophy, which should develop independently of faith and theology. Furthermore, the intellect, and with it the human spirit, is a separate and unique substance for all humanity. This led to the denial of personal immortality, at least from a philosophical point of view, namely, according to Aristotle, given that for the Italian Aristotelians of the Renaissance the Stagirite represented philosophy itself.

Also at that time we find ‘Alexandrian Aristotelianism’, which, following the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias explicitly denied that the spirituality of the human soul was taught by Aristotle. Alexander’s theories were already known in the thirteenth century thanks to Averroes and Gerard of Cremona. However, we cannot maintain that there was an ‘Alexandrian school’ in this period. Apparently, it emerged in the fifteenth century when Aristotle’s Greek texts and those of his early commentators became known. In 1497, the University of Padua even established a chair where the Stagirite was taught in his original language. Furthermore, the treatise *On the Intellect* of Alexander of Aphrodisia, where he held the theory that, according to Aristotle, every man possesses his own intellect, which dies when his body dies, had already been printed in Venice in 1480 (MAURER 1982: 337-338). It is in this context that a justifiable interest in Alexander, one of Aristotle’s great commentators, arose.

Regarding the activity of Averroists and Alexandrians in Padua, Kuksewicz maintains that after the first quarter of the fourteenth century Averroism disappeared from Paris and moved to Italy (KUKSEWICZ 1977: 65. POPPI, 1989: 220-270). This Averroistic Aristotelianism had its own major centre at the University of Padua (DELBOSCO 2011: 374). In 1472, the first Latin edition of the works of Averroes appeared in this city, and many more editions would be printed in the sixteenth century. The Averroist atmosphere of Padua dates back to the early years of the fourteenth century, when John of Jandun, a Parisian Averroist, had to flee Paris and found refuge in Padua, possibly because of his friendship with Marsilius of Padua.¹² Jandun taught at the University of Padua and had a remarkable influence. Pietro Pomponazzi did the same between 1488 and 1509, his tenure in Padua coinciding with Cajetan’s (SARANYANA 2011: 423-424). Moreover, Gaetano di Thiene¹³ and Nicoletto Vernia¹⁴ also taught at the same university, both of them defending the unity of intellect without reservation. In the sixteenth century, Averroistic ideas survived thanks to Agostino Nifo (MAHONEY 2000)—a student of Vernia—and Marco Antonio Zimara (NARDI 1958: 322-355), both of whom were professors in Padua. Next we will deal very briefly with Jandun and Pomponazzi.

¹¹ On the term ‘Averroism’, and in order not to fall into conceptual simplifications, see MINECAN 2010: 63-85.

¹² On Marsilius of Padua, see BERTELLONI 2011: 475-500.

¹³ On this author, see DA VALSANZIBIO 1949.

¹⁴ For an analysis of the thought of this author, see HISSETTE 1987: 195-221.

John of Jandun

Known as *princeps averroistarum*, John of Jandun (1280/89-1328) was a master at the Faculty of Arts in Paris. According to Gilson, Jandun “placed truth on the side of reason and mocked faith” (GILSON 2007: 659), and claimed that in his commentaries it was enough to imitate Averroes. Jandun strived to be a faithful disciple of Averroes whom he called “perfectissimus et gloriosissimus physicus, veritatis amicus et defensor intrepidus” (BRENET 2003: 18). In the words of Jandun, world¹⁵ and motion¹⁶ are eternal, there is only one agent intellect for all humanity,¹⁷ the

¹⁵ Et est considerandum quod licet Aristoteles et Commentator sic dicunt motum semper fuisse, tamen dico quod secundum fidem et veritatem, et hoc simpliciter determino et indubitanter confiteor, quod motus incepit esse, et terminabitur, et non solum motus habuit initium essendi, sed etiam omnia alia entia ab ipso primo principio quod est Deus fuerunt facta postquam non erant; non quidem factione proprie dicta et univoca cum factionibus quae nunc contingunt, scilicet per transmutationem et motum, sed factione omnino aequivoce dicta, sine motu et transmutatione sine subjecto praeexistente. Et sic ante primum motum non fuit aliquis motus, quia production ipsius mobilis non fuit motus, ut frequenter sumitur, nec sequens motum; nec habuit subjectum prius, nec illi potentiae productivae praesupponitur aliqua potentia receptiva; ideo ratio Aristotelis non procedit. Motus etiam terminabitur, et remanebit motor et mobile in aeternum, propter hoc quod ipsum movens primum movet per voluntatem. et ideo potest destruere motum sine omni innovatione sui et mobilis.

Istam autem conclusionem non probo ratione demonstrativa, sicut nec alias quas fide tenemus et quas credendo movemur; nec puto quod sit possibile homini demonstrare eam ex principiis sensibilibus vel assumptis ex sensibilibus. [...] Ratio etiam de tempore solvitur [...] Et cum dicitur quod dispositio quae inest pure per accidens insit omnibus individuis illius speciei praeter duobus, hoc est impossibile; et dico quod nihil est impossibile apud Deum omnipotentem, et multa apparent hominibus impossibilia quae sunt possibilia secundum Deum summum et benedictum. JUAN DE JANDÚN 1501: Book VIII q. 3. Todos los textos de Jandún que citaremos fueron compilados por GILSON 1921: 70-75.

¹⁶ Considerandum est quod licet Aristoteles ita diceret, ut praemissum est, tamen dico secundum fidem et veritatem quod totum tempus est terminatum a parte ante, ita quod aliquod instans sic fuit initium temporis quod non fuit terminus alterius; et terminabitur a parte post, ita quod erit aliquod instans quod sic erit ultimum temporis praecedentis quod non erit initium alterius temporis sequentis. Hoc autem quamvis non sit per se notum, tamen non est demonstrabile aliqua demonstratione ab homine, sed sic esse credimus sola auctoritate divina et scriptura sanctorum. Et ad hujusmodi et similium credulitatem multum facit consuetudo audiendi a pueritia hujusmodi dicta. JUAN DE JANDÚN 1501: Book VIII q. 11.

¹⁷ Nec est aliquid inconveniens quod ipsius hominis sit duplex forma propria, quarum una det ejus corpori esse substantiale, et alia esse intrinsecum operans, a qua denominatur intelligens modo supradicto: praecipue quia homo est ens nobilior et perfectior omnium quae sunt hic. De hoc tamen inquiretur inferius seorsum et divisim ubi quaeretur an anima sensitiva et intellectiva in homine sint una sola substantia animae an diversae. Sed attendendum est quod licet ista fuerit determinatio Aristotelis et Commentatoris, praecipue et hoc non revoco in dubium, tamen dico et firmiter aliter esse dicendum assero, scilicet quod ipsa anima intellectiva est forma substantialis dans esse et unita secundum esse corpori humano, et est talis forma substantialis quae habet initium essendi non quidem ab aliquo agente particulari educente eam de potentia materiae, sed ab agente universali quod est causa totius esse, seu a Deo supremo, producente eam simplici productione sine motu et transmutatione ex nullo subjecto; sicut et omnia alia creavit, et ista quidem substantia virtute divina perpetuabitur in futurum quamvis sit annihilabilis de se. Dico etiam et teneo firmiter hanc substantiam habere virtutes quasdam naturales quae non sunt actus aliquorum corporalium organorum, sed fundantur immediate in essentia animae, et sunt intellectus possibilis et agens et voluntas. Istae quidem virtutes sunt elevatae supra materiam, et capacitatem materiae corporalis superexcellunt, et facultatem ejus supergrediuntur ratione substantiae animae quae non potest totaliter includi a materia; et quamvis ipsa sit in materia, tamen remanet ei aliqua actio in qua materia corporalis non communicat; et omnia talia attributa ei secundum fidem nostram verissima sunt simpliciter et omnino. Et quod ipsa pati potest ab igne corporali et reuniri corpori post mortem jussu creatoris Dei. *Horum autem demonstrationem inducere non intendo, sed simplici fide haec puto esse credenda, ut et alia multa quae credenda sunt sine ratione demonstrativa, sola auctoritate sacrae Scripturae et divinis miraculis approbata. Et sic recipiendo talia nos meremur. Dicunt enim Doctores fidem non habere meritum ubi ratio humana praebet experimentum.*

[...] Rationes autem philosophorum quae contra istam viam esse videntur, solvendae sunt secundum praemissa. Omnes enim procedunt si poneretur animam rationalem esse factam a generante particulari, et per extractionem de

immortality of the soul is an implausible thesis,¹⁸ as are the resurrection¹⁹ and the afterlife. Thus, it is especially interesting to note how Jandun's doctrine shows a clear rupture between faith and reason, which is expressed in the aforementioned theses. For example, in relation to the doctrine of the agent intellect, our author argues as follows:

[...] I say that the intellect is not one in number for all men, but rather it is numbered according to the numbering of human bodies and it is the perfection granted by being *simpliciter*. However, I do not prove this by means of any demonstrative reason, since I do not believe this to be possible, and if someone knows it, let him be glad. But I keep this conclusion *simpliciter* as true and I maintain it without a doubt by faith alone.²⁰

According to Gilson, "the way in which [Jandun] constantly proclaims his submission to the teachings of the Church is truly unsettling" (GILSON 2007: 660). The quoted text, like so many others to which we have referred in footnotes, clearly shows the inevitable conflict established between the arguments of reason and those of faith by the so-called 'prince of Averroists'. In this sense, we share Sellés's view that it is very difficult to deny that Jandun received a notable Averroistic influence, for his texts and various studies show as much (SELLES 2008: 78).

potentia materiae; sed quia non est ita, immo ipsa est creata a Deo immediate, ideo multa potest habere quae aliae formae naturales habere non possunt scilicet quod ipsa remaneat post mortem secundum suam substantiam, non autem in quantum forma; et quod ipsa non sit extensa secundum extensionem corporis, et quod recipiat non individualiter sed universaliter, et quod sit intellectiva per se; et quod possit recipere species intelligibiles et intelligere, et tamen ipsum corpus non recipiet istos actus neque etiam aliqua pars corporis, et omnia talia. Quod si alicui primo aspectu non videretur sufficere ad solutiones rationum, non tamen propter hoc debet conturbari; quia certum est quod auctoritas divina majorem fidem debet facere quam quaecumque ratio humanitus inventa; sicut auctoritas unius philosophi praevalet alicui debili rationi quam aliquis puer induceret. JUAN DE JANDÚN 1544: Book III q. V. Las cursivas son nuestras. Estudios más recientes han mostrado que si bien Juan de Jandún recibió una notable influencia de Averroes, lo criticó por identificar el intelecto con una sustancia separada externa al hombre (SELLES 2008: 78).

¹⁸ Sed quamvis Aristoteles et Commentator sic dicerent et non possent aliud ponere secundum principia concordantia rébus sensatis, tamen ego dico aliter, scilicet quod anima intellectiva hominis est forma communicans esse suum corpori humano, et indivisibilis omnino, et inextensa et per se et per accidens, et perficit totum corpus humanum et omnes ejus partes sine omni alia forma substantiali inhaerente materiae; et ista anima intellectiva incepit esse de novo postquam non erat, non quidem per generationem, sed per creationem ex nihilo, et ista perpetuabitur a parte post virtute divina; *et omnia talia quae dicunt fideles catholici ego dico simpliciter esse vera sine omni dubitatione, sed demonstrare nescio; gaudeant qui hoc sciunt; sed sola fide teneo et confiteor*. Rationem in oppositum dissolve secundum eandem viam. Quamvis enim omnis forma inhaerens materiae esset corruptibilis, tamen dico quod Deus potest eam perpetuare et praeservare a corruptione in aeternum. Modum tamen nescio; Deus scit. (JUAN DE JANDÚN 1544: Book III q. 12. Las cursivas son nuestras.

¹⁹ Ex omnibus his manifestum videtur quod impossibile est aliquid corruptum regenerari idem in numero, et prima ratio forte est efficacior inter omnes. *Considerandum tamen quod licet sic dicerent philosophi, tamen secundum fidem nostram debemus dicere, et ita confiteor et assero simpliciter, quod homo postquam fuerit corruptus vel mortuus, iterum redibit ídem numero simpliciter, sed hoc non erit per regenerationem et per agens naturale, et sic procedunt rationes philosophorum; sed per resurrectionem, aut per iterationem, aut per aliquam hujusmodi viam praeternaturalem, et ab agente universali quod est causator omnium nullo praesupposito subjecto; et hoc non improbant rationes adductae*" (JUAN DE JANDÚN 1501: Book V, q. 14, ad de quaestione). Italics by the author.

²⁰ [...] dico quod intellectus non est unus numero in omnibus hominibus; immo ipse est numeratus in diversis secundum numerationem corporum humanorum, et est perfectio dans esse simpliciter. Hoc autem non probó aliqua ratione demonstrativa, quia hoc non scio esse possibile, et si quis hoc sciât, gaudeat. Istam autem conclusionem assero simpliciter esse veram et indubitanter teneo sola fide (JUAN DE JANDÚN 1544: Book III, q. 7). Translator's Note: Translated into English from the Spanish translation provided by the author.

Pietro Pomponazzi

Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) was also a thinker who came out of the Paduan milieu and then had a decisive influence on it. Born in Mantua, he obtained his doctorate in medicine at the University of Padua, where he later became an extraordinary professor. He taught philosophy in competition with Alessandro Achillini. In 1509, when the University closed as a result of the war of Ghiaradadda he left Padua, moved to the University of Ferrara and finally accepted a professorship at the University of Bologna where he taught from 1512 to 1525, the year of his death (KRISTELLER 1985: 104). As Kristeller notes (1985: 102), Italian Aristotelianism, or Paduan Averroism, produced Pomponazzi, and together with him a whole line of distinguished Aristotelian philosophers.

Three works stand out from Pomponazzi's abundant production (abundant when compared to that of other philosophy professors of the time): *De immortalitate animae* (1516), *De incantationibus* and *De fato* (both written around 1520).²¹ Here we will briefly focus on the first one, for it could have influenced Cajetan's stance on the immortality of the soul (GARIN 1972: 225).

The author begins this treatise with the sentence that man is of a multiple and ambiguous nature, and has an intermediate place between mortal and immortal beings.²² In Chapter IV, responding to a sentence by Averroes that the intellect is capable of acting without the body, Pomponazzi maintains the opposite: he asserts that, according to experience, the intellect does not possess any action that is entirely separable from the body. To corroborate this, he distinguishes between being in the body while having the latter as organ or subject, and depending on the body, which has its perceptions and imaginations as object.²³ That is to say, the intellect does not depend subjectively on the body—because it does not reside in any specific organ—but it does so objectively, for it cannot operate without images (GARCÍA-VALVERDE 2012: 545-566. BRENET 2009. ABBAGNANO 1994: 78). Later, in Chapter VIII and also in Chapter XV, Pomponazzi affirms that he finds no rational evidence to prove the absolute immortality of the soul, although at the same time

²¹ For a comprehensive study of several points of Pomponazzi's doctrine, see: BIARD, and GONTIER 2009. On the immortality of the soul, see the most recent discussion in SPRUIT, LEEN 2017: 225-246.

²² Initium autem considerationis nostrae hinc sumendum duxi, hominem scilicet non simplicis sed multiplicis, non certae sed ancipitis naturae esse mediumque inter mortalia et immortalia collocari [...] Quapropter bene enunciauerunt antiqui cum ipsum inter aeterna et temporalia statuerunt ob eam causam quod neque pure aeternus neque pure temporalis sit, cum de utraque natura participet, ipsique sic in medio existenti data est potestas utram velit naturam induat [...]. (PETRI POMPONAZII 1791: Chap. I, p. 2).

²³ Ergo anima intellective est actus corporis physici organici: cum itaque secundum esse intellectus sit actus corporis physici organici ergo et in omni suo opera dependebit ad organo, aut tanquam subiecto, aut tanquam obiecto: nunquam ergo totaliter absolvetur ad organo (PETRI POMPONAZII, 1791: Chap. IV, p. 9-10).

Ergo movebitur a re corporali, et sic indigebit tanquam obiecto: secunda demonstratio est quod species intelligibilis non recipitur in organo, sed in ipso intellectu. Ergo idem quod prius cum recipere sit pati. Oportet igitur dicere alterum membrum videlicet medium esse quia non indigent corpore tanquam subiecto, licet tanquam obiecto (PETRI POMPONAZII 1791: Chap. IV, p. 18).

he maintains that he does not doubt the veracity of such a doctrine, as it is found in the Holy Scripture.²⁴ In this regard, our author concludes that he does not believe that there is neither any natural reason to affirm such immortality nor to refute its mortality, and that it is ultimately a neutral issue, as is the issue of the eternity of the world. Therefore, Pomponazzi declares, since the question is debatable from the point of view of man, only God can resolve it through his word manifested in the Bible.²⁵

Either by reason or by faith

The presence of a theory of double truth in the works of these Paduan Aristotelians and in those of some of their predecessors is a highly controversial subject that admits diverse nuances and different positions both supporting it (TAHA 2001. KUKSEWICZ 1977: 65-72) and against it (PUTALLAZ 1995: 18-19. DE LIBERA 1989: 25). However, the notion of double truth is not a historiographical chimera, it was Thomas Aquinas himself who addressed it to refer to the thought of the Averroists.²⁶

Leaving aside the debate on this subject, we can be most certain that the authors we have brought to the fore here were convinced that a distinction had to be drawn between faith and reason or between philosophy and theology. In other words, for them it was scientifically unquestionable that one had to either reason within one field or within the other. Each science had its own domain and they should not encroach upon the other. Even contemporary scholars who denigrate the idea

²⁴ De veritate quidem huius positionis apud me nulla piorsus est ambiguitas, cum Scriptura canonica quae quilibet rationi et experimento humano praeferenda est, cum a Deo data sit, hanc positionem sanciat: sed quod apud me vertitur in dubium est, an ista dicta excedant limites naturales; sic quod aliquid vel creditum vel revelatum praesupponant, et conformia sint dictis Aristotelis, sicut ipse Divus Thomas enunciat [...]. (PETRI POMPONAZII 1791: Chap. VIII, p. 28). [...] Ergo probari debet per propria fidei, médium autem quo innititur fides est revelatio, et scriptura Canonica: tantum vere et proprie per haec habet probari: Caeterae vero rationes sunt extranae, innitunturque medio non probante quod intenditur: non igitur mirum est si philosophi inter se discordant de immortalitate animae, cum argumentos extraneis conclusioni, et fallacibus innitantur [...]. (PETRI POMPONAZII 1791: Chap. XV, p. 122).

²⁵ His itaque sic se habentibus, mihi in hac materia dicentium videtur, quod quaestio de immortalitate animae est neutrum problema, sicut etiam de mundi aeternitate: mihi namque videtur quod nullae rationes naturales adduci possunt cogentes animam esse immortalem, minusque probantes animam esse mortalem, sicut quam plures Doctores tenentes eam immortalem declarant; quare nolui ponere responsiones ad alteram partem, cum alii ponens et praecipue D. Thomas, luculenter, copiose et graviter, quapropter dicemus sicut Plato de Legibus certificare de aliquo cum multi ambigunt folius est Dei, cum itaque iam illustres viri inter se ambigant, nisi per Deum hoc certificari posse existimo [...]. (PETRI POMPONAZII 1791: Chap. XV, p. 120).

²⁶ “Que ésta [la teoría de la doble verdad] haya sido realmente sostenida por los maestros de la Facultad de Artes es hoy un hecho discutido, pero es evidente que Santo Tomás, creador del concepto de doble verdad para atribuirlo a los averroístas, está más cercano en el tiempo a tales maestros que algunos medievalistas actuales que niegan de plano la existencia de tal teoría, basados en la inexistencia de textos donde se hable de eso y, esencialmente, en la enérgica protesta de los «averroístas» contra tal acusación” (MARTÍNEZ BARRERA, 2010: 155). [That this [the theory of the double truth] has really been maintained by the masters of the Faculty of Arts is today a disputed fact, but it is evident that Saint Thomas, creator of the concept of the double truth, which he then attributed to the Averroists, was closer in time to such masters than some current medievalists who outright deny the existence of such a theory, based on the inexistence of texts discussing it and, essentially, on the vehement protest of the ‘Averroists’ against such an accusation.]

of a double truth, nevertheless admit the split of faith and reason as present in those philosophers. This is the case of Kristeller, who maintains the following in relation to Pomponazzi and other Aristotelians:

He [Pomponazzi] belongs to the long line of thinkers who have attempted to draw a clear distinction between reason and faith, philosophy and theology, and to establish the autonomy of reason and philosophy within their own domain, free from the demands of any faith or of any claim not based on reason.²⁷

In short, the doctrine of these authors is marked by a radical separation between revelation and reason, which expresses a clear rationalist attitude that does not conform to the spirit of medieval philosophy, characterized by a close and harmonious continuity between the natural and the supernatural realms.

However, in spite of the categorical division between faith and reason made by these thinkers, most of them were believers, and that is why they accepted certain truths on faith. For example, they claimed to believe in the immortality of the soul, but they claimed not to come to it by philosophical means, since it could not be demonstrated on the basis of pure reason. At any rate, for these Aristotelians the philosophical arguments in favour of some of these truths of faith appeared to be rationally less probable than those presented against them.

It may or may not be true that these thinkers argued in this way to conceal their sincere opinion that the soul was mortal, and therefore used this formula to avoid the censures or punishments of the Church. It is not up to us to resolve this matter at this time. What we do want to emphasize is that the stance of the majority of medieval Christian scholastics was to harmonize faith and reason (LOHR 1996: 5); that is why they did not consider a separation between philosophy and theology. This is also why they were rightly called philosophing theologians or simply 'philosophants', given the importance of philosophy in their theological speculation (MAURER 1982: 192). Such is the case of Thomas Aquinas in whom we find a perfect harmony between reason and faith.

However, such a compromise between faith and reason became strikingly problematic in Cajetan, especially given a series of theoretical positions that he held in clear disagreement with the teachings of Aquinas, whose faithful commentator he aimed to be.

²⁷ "Este [Pomponazzi] pertenece a la larga línea de pensadores que han intentado trazar una clara distinción entre razón y fe, filosofía y teología, y establecer la autonomía de la razón y la filosofía dentro de su propio dominio, sin que puedan asaltarlas las exigencias de cualquier fe o de cualquier pretensión no basada en la razón" (KRISTELLER 1985: 121).

The concrete influence on Cajetan

The distinct concept behind secular Aristotelianism is the split between faith and reason, between theology and philosophy, and we believe that this trait pervaded some of Cajetan's theses, fundamentally three of them: the existence of God, the natural desire to see God, and the immortality of the soul. Likewise, there is still a fourth thesis that we will mention at the end given its particularity, that is, it derived from the influence of Scotian Aristotelianism, which also developed in Padua (SCAPIN 1976).

We will not explain each of these theses in detail, since, in addition to having already done so in other recent publications,²⁸ it would exceed the available space and would lead us astray from our main goal, which is to focus on secular Aristotelianism as Cajetan's doctrinal source. Therefore, a brief explanation of each thesis will suffice.

As for the "existence of God" (GELONCH Y MUÑOZ 2012: 327-339), Cajetan maintained that what Thomas Aquinas concluded in his famous *five ways* presented in the *Summa Theologiae* was not the existence of God; in other words, the Cardinal denied that these five ways were true proofs of God's existence. In addition, the alternative interpretation he offers is that the five ways prove the existence of some imprecise and diffuse conditions or attributes that the theologian has then to elaborate in order to apply them to God. The great disadvantage that Cajetan detected in Thomas' ways was that they were problematically located, since they appear in the *Summa Theologiae*, when in fact their status is strictly philosophical, not theological. Our author clearly marked a separation between philosophy and theology, a separation that is not found in Aquinas.²⁹

The second thesis is that of the "natural desire to see God" (MUÑOZ 2016: 627-650 17)edge, New York and London, 2 dad del alama conviene consultar tambimo.nza de aqu la Trinidad y al de la Encarnaciamientos,). Cajetan denied man's natural tendency to see the essence of God. According to this thesis, there would be no natural inclination in the human soul toward supernatural perfections, as there would be no innate appetite for the vision of God's essence. In nature there would only be what Cajetan calls "obediential potential" towards the beatific vision and perfections of a supernatural order, that is, a mere receptive capacity. Our author based his thesis on the fact that these perfections—by virtue of their very nature—belong to a radically different order that is infinitely superior to the natural one. Therefore, it is not possible for passive or receptive potential to show *proportio* in relation to natural and supernatural perfections. Once again the dissent between the natural and the supernatural order seems clear, which on this occasion not only collides with Thomistic theses, but also with a large part of Christian tradition.³⁰

²⁸ We will quote each article below. These include Cajetan's source texts and an abundance of secondary bibliography.

²⁹ A book has just been published in which, among other things, the author shows that the division between theology and philosophy in Thomas Aquinas is more nominal than real; a position with which Cajetan would surely disagree (MENDOZA 2018).

³⁰ On this matter, see the classic study in LUBAC 1998.

The third thesis we want to bring up is that of the “immortality of the soul” (MUÑOZ 2013: 33-49). Unlike in the two aforementioned cases, here Cajetan varied his stance throughout his life. We will only consider his final view on the subject, which is expressed in his commentaries on the Holy Scriptures, where he holds a position very close to that of Pomponazzi. For Cajetan, the immortality of the soul is a subject that can be equated with the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation of the Word, about which it can be said that they are not to be understood but to be believed. That is to say, the immortality of the soul is a truth that is accessible or cognizable only through faith, but not through reason. According to Cajetan, this does not imply that no natural arguments can be made to prove it, but they will have a merely probable character, not one of certainty. It seems evident that the theory of double truth can be glimpsed in this controversial thesis which, also, diverges from the texts of Thomas Aquinas.

The fourth thesis, of Aristotelian-Scotian roots, is the one that maintains “the difference between the first entity apprehended by the intellect and that which is the object of metaphysics” (MUÑOZ 2017: 125-138). This thesis had a peculiar role in the history of metaphysics because the famous theory of the three degrees of abstraction is derived from it. According to said theory, the speculative sciences diversify according to the different abstractions operated by human intelligence. However, our interest lies in such a thesis to the extent that it is the fruit of the controversy between Cajetan and the Franciscan Antonio Trombetta, one of the most important disciples of John Duns Scotus and also a Padovan Aristotelian (FORLIVESI 2004: 174 and 183). Trombetta was a contemporary of Thomas de Vio and also taught as moderator in the Scotus chair at the University of Padua.

According to Trombetta, who followed Scotus and refuted Thomas, the first thing known is not the entity but the *species specialissima*, the singular of which first and most effectively moves the sense. The main reason he provided was that metaphysics has the entity as its object, but if metaphysics is the last of the sciences achieved through the intellect (after physics and mathematics), then, Trombetta concluded, the entity cannot be the first thing known by intelligence. Cajetan responded to this confutation by saying that one is the *ens primum cadit* (reached through abstraction from particulars, also called neutral abstraction) and another is the entity as the object of metaphysics (reached through the third degree of formal abstraction).

What we would like to highlight from this last Cajetan thesis is that it is not present in the Thomistic context of the division of sciences, but in a Scotian framework. And it is here that we see the strong influence that Scotian Aristotelianism had on the Cardinal. It was such that Thoms de Vio accepted a large part of Trombetta's objection (the first known entity and that of metaphysics are different) and thus adhered—albeit, we believe, inadvertently—to a way of understanding knowledge closer to Scotian formalism than to Thomas Aquinas (MUÑOZ, 2015: 23-39).

A coda

For a long time, scholars have repeatedly claimed that Cajetan was a staunch Thomist, and for this reason—besides his keen intelligence, subtle writing, and praiseworthy work of restoration—he was considered the official commentator of Aquinas, to the point that his glosses to the *Summa Theologiae* were published almost in their entirety in the *editio Piana* of Thomas's *Opera omnia* and again later in the *editio Leonina*. However, what we have tried to show in this paper is that despite his reputation as a true Thomist, some of his doctrinal advances (which are central in Thomist doctrine) do not conform to what Thomas Aquinas thought, but they do conform to a greater degree to the postulates of secular Aristotelianism and to that of several of its most eminent representatives, for example John of Jandun and Pietro Pomponazzi. This fact would not be so surprising if more attention were paid to the doctrinal historical context in which Cajetan was educated: the University of Padua and its Averroistic atmosphere.

Proper philosophical hermeneutics should at least include three elements when approaching an author—be it Cajetan or any other: their express philosophical allegiance (Cajetan was indeed a major disciple of Thomas Aquinas); the doctrinal and cultural context of the time (such as the prevalence of the theory of double truth in a Christian university); and their personal situation (Cajetan was a friar). The studies that only see continuity between Aquinas and Cajetan may have placed too much emphasis on the first and last premises, namely, he was a disciple of Aquinas who was also a friar. Likewise, this question of misplaced emphasis probably shifted the focus from the cultural context in which Cajetan lived, forgetting that this context also had a preponderant role in the education and doctrinal advances of this remarkable sixteenth-century philosopher and theologian.

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