L'émergence d'un constructivisme psychologique: épistemologie génétique et étude du développement

Abstract

Piaget's enterprise, elaborating un interdisciplinary "genetic epistemology", developed during several decades without any reference to constructivism, i.e., un epistemological theory proper to mathemtics. However, logic has a central role within genetic epistemology, which is evident when looking ut the "circle of sciences", a fundamental imge recurrent in Piaget's writings. It presents the horizontal links between domains, the vertical links between objects, theories and epistemologies (domin specific), and provides a scientijic basis to epistemology. However, in spite of the many arguments in favor of this scheme, several unsolved problems remain, namely regarding the ambiguous relationship between biology and psychology. The author first presents Piaget's position, by summarizing the arguments linked to the circle of sciences and defining some of the fundamental psychological concepts. She then discusses the notion of "subject", and finally suggest a hierarchy of the objects of the psychologist-epistemologist, beginning with the sensori-motor subject and culminating (!) with the ,formalizer who builds himself using the tools he has himself constructed.