The Problematic Around the Biological Concept of Species and its Ethical Implications

Authors

  • Alejandro Villamor Iglesias Investigador independiente

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1344/oxi.2018.i13.21910

Keywords:

Species, Biological concept of species, Monism, Pluralism, Speciesism

Abstract

Far from being rigorously defined, the concept of species in a biological sense has suffered from imprecision since Charles Darwin. This is mainly due to the absence of a definition that allows to combine within each species the organisms that are considered part of it. The objective of this work is to show, on the one hand, the diversity of characterizations of the concept of species as well as their respective problems and, on the other, the different sustainable ontological positions. As a consequence of the aforementioned imprecision, the ethical consequences that this entails in the debate about speciesism are analyzed.

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Published

2018-07-17

How to Cite

Villamor Iglesias, A. (2018). The Problematic Around the Biological Concept of Species and its Ethical Implications. OXIMORA International Journal of Ethics and Politics, (13), 328–341. https://doi.org/10.1344/oxi.2018.i13.21910

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