On the Is-Ought Problem from a Metaethical Point of View
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1344/oxmora.23.2023.42422Keywords:
Naturalismo, Falacia naturalista, Metaética, Ser y deber serAbstract
David Hume presented in a well-known passage of his Treatise of Human Nature a simple argument against the moral philosophers of his time who concluded normative propositions from purely descriptive premises (e.g. "God exists, therefore one must not lie"). From then on, a range of responses and objections was opened regarding the validity of these inferences, which slip even to our days. Through the defense of naturalism, we can give arguments to reject hume's law. However, the aim of this paper is not to continue adding to an already considerable pile of arguments for and against this law, but rather to reconsider the discussion in the light of the field of Metaethics.
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