Epistemology of Decisions: the Relational Construction of Non-Existences
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1344/oxmora.2023.i22.41045Keywords:
Epistemic Existence, Epistemicide, Metaargumentation, ReasonablenessAbstract
This article explores the idea that "epistemic existence" is a relational condition that comes about when one actively participates in making decisions that concern them. In the first place, this concept is reviewed in the context of face-to-face relationships, appealing to a typical case of a couple in which both -without realizing it- are epistemically constructed as non-existent. The operation of an epistemicidal functioning logic is shown. In the second part, it is proposed that an exit strategy from this mode of operation would be based on the possibility of meta-arguing. To do this, a distinction is made between the informational level and the relational level of the conversations (it is also suggested that this difference may itself be a source of new conflict). In the third and fourth sections, it is analyzed how the oppositional dynamics between affectively linked interlocutors acquire an emotional tint that greatly complicates the argument, especially when the arguers share -without knowing it- a contentious or bellicose representation about the exchange of reasons. Finally, it is concluded that these epistemic practices are detrimental to possibility of increasing the degree of reasonableness between the interlocutors, thereby preventing the emergence of less painful ways of inhabiting disagreements.
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