Two justifications for human reproductive cloning: the desire for sons and the value of life
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1344/rbd2014.32.10692Keywords:
human cloning, desire for sons, reproductive freedom, value of life, social solidarityAbstract
The following paper deals with the analysis of two of the main arguments put forward to justify the human reproductive cloning: the desire for sons and the value of life. Distinguishing the first from the concept of reproductive freedom which appeals to a freedom that is not such, the desire for sons implies a request for solidarity to society and the State, who must determine if it is convenient to give that help. This means that legalization of human reproductive cloning implies ethical issues, but also the administration of scarce social resources. From another side, with the category of the value of life some authors claim to justify the birth of a human being through cloning, as it would be better to live than to never have been born, provided this life would not be unworthy to be lived, as a result of continuous and deep suffering. Consequently, the risks of this technique would be compensated by the fact that this kid would have no better possibility to exist than that one. The aim here is to examine to which extent this reasoning turns out to be acceptable.Downloads
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